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TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 
Cassandra Burke Robertson* 
Abstract: When U.S. corporations cause harm abroad, should foreign 
plaintiffs be allowed to sue in the United States? Federal courts are in-
creasingly saying no. The courts have expanded the doctrines of forum 
non conveniens and prudential standing to dismiss a growing number of 
transnational cases. This restriction of court access has sparked consider-
able tension in international relations, as a number of other nations view 
such dismissals as an attempt to insulate U.S. corporations from liability. A 
growing number of countries have responded by enacting retaliatory leg-
islation that may ultimately harm U.S. interests. This Article argues that 
the judiciary’s restriction of access to federal courts ignores important 
foreign relations, trade, and regulatory considerations. The Article ap-
plies institutional choice theory to recommend a process by which the 
three branches of government can work together to establish a more co-
herent court-access policy for transnational cases. 
Introduction 
 In the summer of 2009, Chevron squarely faced the old adage “be 
careful what you wish for.”1 Texaco, a company that would later merge 
with Chevron, had successfully argued for dismissal of a large environ-
mental case in 2001.2 Texaco argued that Ecuador was a more conven-
                                                                                                                      
* © 2010, Cassandra Burke Robertson, Associate Professor, Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity School of Law. Thanks to Jonathan H. Adler, Samuel P. Baumgartner, Jonathan 
Entin, Peter Gerhart, Sharona Hoffman, Jacqueline Lipton, Lumen Mulligan, Gary Sim-
son, David Shapiro, Christopher A. Whytock, the participants at the 2009 Junior Federal 
Courts Conference, and the participants at the Northeast Ohio Faculty Colloquium for 
valuable input and comments on earlier versions of this Article. Andrea Ball, Patricia 
Schaal, and Jacob Wolf provided outstanding research assistance. 
1 See Daniel Fisher, Careful What You Ask For, Forbes, July 13, 2009, at 92. See generally 
W.W. Jacobs, The Monkey’s Paw (Books of Wonder 1997) (1902) (illustrating, through a 
fictional horror story, the consequences of wishes coming true). 
2 See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see also Corte-
lyou Kenney, Disaster in the Amazon: Dodging “Boomerang Suits” in Transnational Human Rights 
Litigation, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 857, 858–63 (2009); Judith Kimerling, Indigenous Peoples and the 
Oil Frontier in Amazonia: The Case of Ecuador, ChevronTexaco, and Aguinda v. Texaco, 38 
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 413, 474–84 (2006) (analyzing the facts giving rise to the envi-
ronmental litigation). 
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ient forum and better suited to hear the case, which had arisen from 
actions taken in Ecuadorian territory.3 By moving for dismissal under 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, Texaco seemed to make a wise 
strategic choice: plaintiffs rarely re-filed cases dismissed under forum 
non conveniens,4 and even when they did, damages in courts outside 
the United States tended to be significantly lower.5 
 In this case, however, a series of events converged to make the 
choice less strategically sound than it appeared at the outset.6 First, in 
2003, the plaintiffs did re-file the suit in Ecuador,7 armed with the de-
fendant’s agreement to accede to jurisdiction in Ecuador and bolstered 
by the defendant’s own court filings praising the Ecuadorian court sys-
tem.8 
 Second, Ecuador, like many Latin American countries, objected to 
the U.S. practice of discretionarily dismissing cases in the absence of 
any jurisdictional barrier.9 Ecuador follows a civil law tradition that al-
                                                                                                                      
3 Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 546. 
4 David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: “A Rather Fantastic 
Fiction,” 103 L.Q. Rev. 398, 418–20 (1987) (concluding after empirical study that only 
eighteen percent of personal injury plaintiffs and twenty percent of commercial plaintiffs 
re-filed cases abroad after forum non conveniens dismissals). Defendants in other cases 
have also engaged in strategies that make sense only by assuming that a dismissal for forum 
non conveniens would end the case. See, e.g., Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 
720 (1st Cir. 1996). In Nowak, the defendant sought dismissal by arguing that the plaintiff 
could better enforce the judgment in Hong Kong. See id. As one scholar has noted, “Say-
ing, ‘No, please sue me where you have some chance of collecting my money if you win,’ 
only makes sense if you know that your bluff is unlikely to be called.” Martin Davies, Time to 
Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 309, 351 (2002). 
5 See Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of 
Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 31 (2002). 
6 See infra notes 7–18 and accompanying text. 
7 Kimerling, supra note 2, at 629. 
8 Ben Casselman, Chevron Expects to Fight Ecuador Lawsuit in U.S.: As Largest Environ-
mental Judgment on Record Looms, the Oil Company Reassures Shareholders It Won’t Pay, Wall St. 
J., July 21, 2009, at B3. 
9 Ronald A. Brand & Scott R. Jablonski, Forum Non Conveniens: History, 
Global Practice, and Future Under the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements 128, 133–34 (2007) (discussing the effort in Latin America to create laws that 
will make U.S. courts less willing to dismiss suits by Latin American plaintiffs). Although 
Latin American countries have been especially vocal in their opposition to forum non 
conveniens, others, including attorneys in the United States, have also criticized the doc-
trine for allowing a trial judge’s discretion to overrule the will of Congress. See, e.g., Hu 
Zhenjie, Forum Non Conveniens: An Unjustified Doctrine, 48 N. Ir. L. Rep. 143, 159–60 
(2001); Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 781, 781 (1985) (describing a hypothetical situation in which a lawyer ex-
plains to a client that “we served the defendant with a summons at its place of business . . . 
[and sued] in one of the places in which Congress in the venue statute said a defendant 
may be sued, [and] persuad[ed] the court that our choice of forum was reasonable under 
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lows plaintiffs to bring suit in the defendant’s home forum.10 Allowing 
U.S. judges to discretionarily dismiss cases against U.S. corporations 
contravenes this strong sociolegal tradition and gives rise to the criti-
cism that the forum non conveniens doctrine operates as a “tool to es-
cape liability,” denying foreign plaintiffs the advantages of the U.S. fed-
eral court system.11 
 Third, as a result of frustration with the U.S. courts’ failure to re-
spond to these concerns about the forum non conveniens doctrine, the 
Latin American Parliament (Parlatino)12 drafted a “Model Law on In-
ternational Jurisdiction and Applicable Law to Tort Liability.”13 The 
model law, which was widely accepted by Latin American countries, 
permits national courts to award damages comparable to what a U.S. 
court would award in an international tort case, specifying that “the 
national court may, at the plaintiff’s request, apply to damages and to 
the pecuniary sanctions related to such damages, the relevant standards 
and amounts of the pertinent foreign law.”14 
 These three factors combined to produce a bad result for Chevron 
when the case was tried in Ecuador.15 An expert retained by the trial 
court recommended a judgment of twenty-seven billion dollars—an 
amount that, if accepted by the judge, would be the largest award for 
environmental damage ever awarded against an oil company.16 Chevron 
is challenging the Ecuadorian court’s action in U.S. courts, but its ability 
to do so is hampered by its earlier argument that Ecuador, not the 
                                                                                                                      
the due process clause of the Constitution,” but the judge nevertheless decided that that 
the forum was not appropriate). 
10 Brand & Jablonski, supra note 9, at 128. 
11 See id. at 129. Ecuadorians may have found the denial of court access to be particu-
larly galling, as Ecuador had signed on to the Peace, Friendship, Navigation, and Com-
merce Treaty with the United States, which provides for “open and free” access to U.S. 
courts. Id. at 129–30 (specifying that such advantages include: “liberal discovery rules; 
proximity to the assets of U.S. corporate defendants; perceived higher damage awards; 
punitive damages; jury trials; favorable products liability laws; the contingent fee system; 
and the lack of a loser-pays rule for attorney fees”). 
12 Parlatino is an organization comprising members of Latin American legislatures. 
Michael Wallace Gordon, Forum Non Conveniens Misconstrued: A Response to Henry Saint Dahl, 
38 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 141, 176 (2006). 
13 Brand & Jablonski, supra note 8, at 132–33. 
14 Id. Professor Russell Weintraub, professor emeritus at the University of Texas Law 
School, describes such statutes as telling defendants: “You want to try the case here. Wel-
come. You will be sorry.” Fisher, supra note 1, at 93. 
15 See Casselman, supra note 8, at B3. 
16 60 Minutes: Amazon Crude (CBS News television broadcast May 3, 2009)(transcript 
available at cbsnews.com). 
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United States, was the appropriate forum in which to resolve the case.17 
In order to prevail in the United States, Chevron would have to demon-
strate that the Ecuadorian justice system was incompatible with due 
process requirements—a difficult argument to make after asking a U.S. 
court to dismiss the case in favor of an Ecuadorian forum in 2001.18 
 Although Chevron’s difficulty may indeed be a “self-inflicted in-
jury,”19 it showcases larger issues that heretofore have only been ad-
dressed in a piecemeal and contradictory fashion.20 U.S. courts draw 
litigants worldwide, but to what extent should those courts be open to 
foreign plaintiffs? Academic scholarship has long noted the “magnet 
effect” of U.S. courts, and scholars have debated whether efforts should 
be taken to demagnetize U.S. courts.21 In recent years, federal judges 
have been taking a lead in limiting access to U.S. courts by aggressively 
enforcing and expanding the doctrine of forum non conveniens.22 The 
effort to limit access was recently taken to the logical extreme in 2009, 
in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., in which the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia simply held that foreign plaintiffs lack pruden-
tial standing to sue in U.S. courts for harms suffered abroad.23 
 What happens, however, when an effort to push transnational liti-
gation out of U.S. courts meets retaliatory legislation aimed at making 
                                                                                                                      
17 See Ben Casselman & Chad Bray, Ecuador Seeks To Block Chevron, Wall St. J., Dec. 5–6, 
2009, at B6. 
18 See Fisher, supra note 1, at 93. The enforcement of foreign judgments is largely gov-
erned by state law. Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, 993 (10th Cir. 2005). The 
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act, which has been widely adopted, pro-
vides that a foreign judgment need not be enforced if “the judgment was rendered under 
a system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the re-
quirements of due process of law” or is otherwise “repugnant to the public policy of [the 
enforcing] state.” Id. (citing the Act as adopted by New Mexico). For a discussion of the 
possible application of collateral estoppel or judicial estoppel to prevent a defendant who 
successfully moved for forum non conveniens from later objecting to the enforcement of 
the resulting judgment, see Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legisla-
tion: The Impact on the Available Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirability of Forum Non 
Conveniens as a Defense Tactic, 56 U. Kan. L. Rev. 609, 641–42 (2008). 
19 See Fisher, supra note 1, at 92. 
20 See Gary B. Born & Peter B. Rutledge, International Civil Litigation in 
United States Courts 368–73, 377–80 (4th ed. 2007) (“[T]he forum non conveniens doc-
trine rests on unarticulated and unexamined substantive assumptions.”). 
21 Russell J. Weintraub, International Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens, 29 Tex. Int’l 
L.J. 321, 352 (1994) [hereinafter Weintraub, International Litigation] (“The United States is 
a magnet forum for the afflicted of the world.”); Russell J. Weintraub, The United States as a 
Magnet Forum and What, if Anything, to Do About It, in International Dispute Resolution: 
The Regulation of Forum Selection 213 ( Jack L. Goldsmith ed., 1997) [hereinafter 
Weintraub, Dispute Resolution]. 
22 Weintraub, Dispute Resolution, supra note 21, at 225–31. 
23 658 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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foreign courts more hospitable for claims against U.S. corporate de-
fendants? This Article argues that ad hoc judicial efforts to limit court 
access may backfire as foreign courts begin to award large judgments 
against U.S. defendants.24 A more coherent court-access policy is sorely 
needed. 
 Determining what that court-access policy should look like, how-
ever, requires examining the question of who should decide. Which 
court-access questions are best resolved by Congress or the executive, 
and which should remain with the judiciary?25 Despite the criticism lev-
eled against current court-access doctrine, many have assumed that 
judges will remain the architects of future court-access policies.26 This 
focus on the judiciary as the agent of change, however, is at odds with 
the larger academic move toward comparative institutional analysis.27 
Comparative institutional choice requires analyzing not only the legal 
rules themselves, but also who should make them: which institution is 
the most appropriate vehicle for legal reform?28 Although a few schol-
ars have recommended extrajudicial changes, this Article is the first to 
undertake a comparative institutional choice analysis of the court-
access doctrines.29 
 Part I examines the magnetic effect of U.S. courts, which draw for-
eign plaintiffs through generous discovery, higher damages, and con-
tingent fee representation.30 This Part analyzes the growing judicial re-
action to this magnetic effect.31 At the extreme, judges may deny pru-
                                                                                                                      
24 See infra notes 88–101 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 212--278 and accompanying text. 
26 See, e.g., Elizabeth T. Lear, National Interests, Foreign Injuries, and Federal Forum Non 
Conveniens, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 559, 602–03 (2007); Note, Cross-Jurisdictional Forum Non 
Conveniens Preclusion, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 2178, 2195–99 (2008); Emily J. Derr, Note, Striking 
a Better Public-Private Balance in Forum Non Conveniens, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 819, 841–48 
(2008); Finity E. Jernigan, Note, Forum Non Conveniens: Whose Convenience and Justice?, 86 
Tex. L. Rev. 1079, 1120–21 (2008); Leah Nico, Note, From Local to Global: Reform of Forum 
Non Conveniens Needed to Ensure Justice in the Era of Globalization, 11 Sw. J. L. & Trade Am. 
345, 360–62 (2005). 
27 See infra notes 212-278 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 212-278 and accompanying text. 
29 See, e.g., E.E. Daschbach, Where There’s a Will, There’s a Way: The Cause for a Cure and 
Remedial Prescriptions for Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in Latin American Plaintiffs’ Actions 
Against U.S. Multinationals, 13 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 11, 65 (2007) (recommending the 
creation of a new international tribunal to hear transnational tort cases); Linda J. Silber-
man, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation: 
Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 28 Tex. Int’l L.J. 501, 518, 524–28 
(1993) (recommending a federal statute that would limit foreign plaintiff access to U.S. 
courts in cases where claims arise outside of the United States). 
30 See infra notes 46–78 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 56–78 and accompanying text. 
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dential standing to foreign plaintiffs; more commonly, however, judges 
will invoke their discretionary power to dismiss foreign plaintiffs’ cases 
through the doctrine of forum non conveniens.32 In light of these access 
restrictions, this Part then examines the emerging international back-
lash against the dismissal of cases involving U.S. defendants, as other 
nations—particularly in Latin America—adopt strategies intended to 
deter such dismissals by making their own courts appear to be a less at-
tractive option for U.S. defendants.33 
 Part II argues that the judge-made court-access doctrines have ex-
panded beyond their initial prudential focus, as they implicate substan-
tive economic, regulatory, and foreign relations policy interests.34 In 
this Part, I argue that the competing components of these access doc-
trines must be openly acknowledged and evaluated.35 The prudential 
component serves the goals of fair and efficient adjudication, while the 
policy strand promotes substantive economic and political goals.36 The 
judiciary has been inconsistent, and often contradictory, about what 
the court-access doctrines are intended to accomplish, frequently con-
flating the various policy and prudential goals.37 This inconsistency has 
led to doctrinal confusion over questions such as whether the trial 
judge’s discretion allows for retention of cases, whether a foreign plain-
tiff may choose to foreclose a formerly available foreign forum, and 
whether there is a state or national interest in regulating the conduct of 
U.S corporations abroad.38 Until the separate underpinnings of these 
court-access doctrines are acknowledged, the doctrines will serve nei-
ther the prudential goals nor the policy goals successfully.39 
 Part III applies institutional choice theory to analyze the relative 
institutional competence of each of the three branches in developing a 
more coherent court-access policy.40 Section A articulates both pruden-
tial and policy goals for a court access doctrine.41 On the prudential 
side, I suggest that the doctrine should promote predictability and uni-
formity of application.42 On the policy side, I argue that the doctrine 
                                                                                                                      
32 See infra notes 56–78 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 79–101 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 102–211 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 102–211 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 102–211 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 102–211 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 102–211 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 102–211 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 212–278 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra notes 217–225 and accompanying text. 
42 See infra note 217 and accompanying text. 
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should be sensitive to the foreign relations impact of dismissals, regulate 
U.S. defendants’ conduct abroad, take advantage of the opportunity to 
export American due process values, and provide an effective mecha-
nism for corrective justice.43 Section B examines how the three branches 
of government can work to realize these goals.44 Finally, Section C rec-
ommends that reform begin with Congress, which should articulate an 
initial court-access policy, then turn to the executive branch to negotiate 
bilateral treaties and multilateral court-access conventions, and con-
clude with the judiciary having a more limited role in applying these 
policies to individual cases.45 
 The time has come for U.S. institutions to coordinate a more ef-
fective court-access policy. The doctrines regulating foreign plaintiffs’ 
access to U.S. courts have long been confused, contradictory, and inef-
fective. As long as dismissal represented a “win” for U.S. corporate de-
fendants, there was previously little incentive for them to support re-
form of court-access doctrines. Now, that may change: with other coun-
tries beginning to impose draconian remedies against U.S. defendants 
in transnational cases, the moment is right for marshalling support 
within the United States to enact a more coherent court-access policy. 
I. The United States as a Magnet Forum 
 U.S. courts are highly attractive to foreign plaintiffs for several rea-
sons. First, compensatory damages tend to be higher in the United 
States than abroad, and many cases also carry the possibility of recover-
ing punitive damages.46 Second, the United States allows lawyers to 
bring cases on a contingent fee basis, so that plaintiffs do not risk hav-
ing to pay significant attorneys’ fees if they lose the case.47 Discovery is 
also more widely available than in foreign courts, offering plaintiffs ac-
                                                                                                                      
43 See infra notes 218–225 and accompanying text. 
44 See infra notes 226–268 and accompanying text. 
45 See infra notes 270–278 and accompanying text. 
46 Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, 733 (C.A. 1982) (“As 
a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States. If he can only get 
his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune.”); Stephens, supra note 5, at 31 
(“Comparative studies of damage awards find not only that U.S. awards are much higher 
than those in any other country, but also find great disparities even within Europe and ‘a 
pattern of low awards’ in jurisdictions where ‘the standard of living is low and the economy 
underdeveloped.’ Moreover, amounts are much lower even in the more prosperous coun-
tries outside of Europe, such as Japan.”). 
47 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.5(c)–(d) (2009) (prohibiting lawyers from 
collecting contingent fees only when they represent a defendant in a criminal case or in 
certain domestic relations matters). 
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cess to the evidence they need to prove their case.48 Finally, class action 
litigation is also widely available, encouraging litigation even in cases 
where individual damages are likely to be small.49 
 The “magnet effect”50 of the U.S. courts is enhanced by a socio-
legal expectation, present especially in Latin American civil law coun-
tries, that a defendant can reliably be sued in its home forum.51 Discre-
tionary dismissal is virtually unknown in civil law systems; instead, juris-
diction in civil law countries is based on the “belief in the predictability 
of comprehensive procedure codes created by the legislature and the 
absence of all but minimal discretion in the role of the judge.”52 Thus, 
the civil law countries largely require the first court seised with jurisdic-
tion to hear the case.53 This process is combined with a strict rule of lis 
pendens, which provides that once a case has been filed in a competent 
court, no other court can have jurisdiction over it.54 
 Accustomed to justice systems with a long tradition of basing juris-
diction on the defendant’s residence, foreign plaintiffs may be sur-
prised and dismayed to learn that U.S. courts can dismiss cases against 
U.S. corporate defendants under the assumption that the plaintiff’s 
home forum is a more convenient choice.55 
A. Common Law Court-Access Doctrines 
 Although foreign plaintiffs desire—and expect—to be able to sue 
U.S. defendants in U.S. courts, the courts themselves are increasingly 
resisting such suits and limiting foreign plaintiffs’ access to the federal 
courts.56 At the extreme, one court has recently held that foreign plain-
                                                                                                                      
48 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981) (“[D]iscovery is more ex-
tensive in American than in foreign courts.”); Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, 
Civil Procedure Reform in Comparative Context: The United States of America, 45 Am. J. Comp. L. 
675, 678 (1997) (“Both inside and outside the United States, American pretrial has been 
criticized for encouraging ‘easy’ pleadings (i.e., statements of claim and defense) and 
‘broad’ discovery . . . .”). 
49 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (detailing class action procedure). 
50 Weintraub, Dispute Resolution, supra note 21, at 213. 
51 Brand & Jablonski, supra note 9, at 128. 
52 Id. at 121. 
53 Id. 
54 Martine Stückelberg, Lis Pendens and Forum Non Conveniens at the Hague Conference, 26 
Brook. J. Int’l L. 949, 950–51, 958–59 (2001). 
55 Zhenjie, supra note 9, at 159–60. Foreign plaintiffs may also view such dismissals as a 
tool to insulate U.S. corporations from liability. Id. at 159 (“US courts have in fact been 
manipulating the doctrine to . . . prevent the application of the plaintiff-favouring rules to 
foreign plaintiffs . . . . ‘[P]laintiff-favoring rules of liability and damages’ are applied exclu-
sively to the local plaintiffs.”). 
56 Id. at 159–60. 
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tiffs simply lack standing to sue for harms occurring outside the coun-
try unless there is a specific exception granted by Congress or the Con-
stitution.57 Under this view, U.S. courts are a scarce resource that the 
judiciary must jealously guard.58 Non-resident aliens presumably have 
recourse to their home courts and should be expected to sue there.59 
 At this point, only one U.S. district court has expanded the pruden-
tial standing doctrine to categorically deny foreign plaintiffs access to 
U.S. courts, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit may yet reverse the decision.60 Yet judges commonly apply the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens to dismiss such cases. The doctrine 
of forum non conveniens operates on a case-by-case basis, rather than 
categorically requiring dismissal.61 It allows a district judge to dismiss a 
case “‘when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear [the] case, and 
. . . trial in the chosen forum would establish . . . oppressiveness and 
vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff’s conven-
ience, or . . . the chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considera-
tions affecting the court’s own administrative and legal problems.’”62 
 When the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens,63 it set forth a number of “private interest” and “public in-
                                                                                                                      
57 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 658 F. Supp. 2d 131, 134–35 (D.D.C. 2009). 
58 See id. (“[W]here a non-resident alien ‘is harmed in his own country, he cannot and 
should not expect entitlement to the advantages of a United States court.’”) (quoting Ber-
lin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 152 (D.D.C. 1976)). 
59 Berlin Democratic Club, 410 F. Supp. at 152 (“[T]he rationale for permitting a resident 
alien access to United States courts is ‘an implied assurance of safe conduct’ in this coun-
try. No similar assurance is or need be given to a citizen of a foreign country, who is not 
subjected to the laws of this country and who can utilize the laws of his own country to 
protect himself.”). 
60 See Julian Ku, A Completely New Standing Argument Against the Alien Tort Statute, Opinio 
Juris (Oct. 18, 2009, 22:26 EST), http://opiniojuris.org/2009/10/18/a-completely-new-
standing-argument-against-the-alien-tort-statute/ (predicting reversal of Doe). Interestingly, 
Judge Royce Lamberth was the judge in Doe and the defense attorney seeking dismissal in 
Berlin Democratic Club. See Doe, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 132; Berlin Democratic Club, 410 F. Supp. at 
147. 
61 Edward L. Barrett, Jr., The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 Cal. L. Rev. 380, 387–
88 (1947); John Bies, Conditioning Forum Non Conveniens, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 489, 497–98 
(2000); Robert Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 908, 912 (1947); 
Douglas W. Dunham & Eric F. Gladbach, Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign Plaintiffs in the 
1990s, 24 Brook. J. Int’l L. 665, 667 (1999). 
62 Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429 (2007) (quoting 
Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447–48 (1994)). As discussed in Part II, however, 
district courts have sometimes dismissed cases even when these requirements are not met. 
63 Dunham & Gladbach, supra note 61, at 668–69. The Court initially adopted the doc-
trine in the context of domestic litigation (allowing dismissal in favor of another federal 
court). Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 510-12 (1947) (finding New York to be an 
inconvenient forum compared to Virginia); Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 
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terest” factors that courts should consider in deciding whether to dis-
miss. On the private side, it included the availability of evidence and 
witnesses, the costs of trial, the enforceability of the ultimate judgment, 
and the plaintiffs’ motivation in choosing the forum.64 On the public 
side, it mentioned the crowdedness of the docket, the potential need to 
call jurors from a community with little relationship to the litigation, 
and the familiarity of the court with governing law.65 
 At the outset, the Court did not trouble itself too much with how, 
exactly, these factors should be evaluated.66 As a result, the motivating 
policy behind a forum non conveniens dismissal depends very much 
on the worldview of the judge deciding the motion.67 Truly easy cases 
rarely require a forum non conveniens analysis, as a federal court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction when all the factors point to dismissal: if no 
party is a U.S. citizen, and if the case does not arise under federal law, 
then there is no subject matter jurisdiction in federal court.68 Thus, 
cases that turn on forum non conveniens are necessarily cases in which 
these factors point in different directions.69 Perhaps the case may be 
unrelated to the forum, but the forum court’s docket may nevertheless 
be less crowded than most, allowing the case to be heard quickly.70 Or 
witnesses may be difficult to obtain, but U.S. law may govern the case 
and any judgment may be easily enforceable in the United States.71 
Thus, ruling on a forum non conveniens motion requires the judge to 
not only balance competing facts, but also to balance competing poli-
cies: is docket control more important than the plaintiffs’ conven-
ience?72 Does the risk of offending another country’s government by 
                                                                                                                      
518, 531-32 (1947) (finding New York to be an inconvenient forum compared to Illinois). 
The current venue statute, however, allows transfer among federal district courts for con-
venience and therefore renders the doctrine unnecessary in domestic federal litigation. 28 
U.S.C. § 1404 (2006); Sinochem Int’l Co., 549 U.S. at 430 (“The common-law doctrine of 
forum non conveniens ‘has continuing application [in federal courts] only in cases where the 
alternative forum is abroad,’ and perhaps in rare instances where a state or territorial 
court serves litigational convenience best.”). 
64 Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508. 
65 Id. 
66 See id. at 507–09 (describing the history and workings of the doctrine). 
67 See id. 
68 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (2006). Of course, a case with only foreign parties may still 
be heard if the case arises under federal law, including cases arising under statutes such as 
the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006), or the Class Action Fairness 
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715 (2006). 
69 See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508–09. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. 
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dismissing a case brought by its citizens outweigh the inconvenience 
imposed on local citizens who must sit on a jury for a case with no con-
nection to their community?73 And, although not officially part of the 
analysis, the judge’s thoughts about contingent-fee cases, American 
damage awards, and the tort system in general will influence how the 
judge weighs those competing policies.74 
 Thus, the forum non conveniens doctrine leaves the difficult deci-
sion to the trial judge, who must decide for him- or herself how to 
weigh the competing considerations and decide whether to retain the 
case or dismiss it.75 The Supreme Court acknowledged the high level of 
discretion given to the trial judge, noting that “it has not been at-
tempted to catalogue the circumstances which will justify or require 
either grant or denial of remedy,” and that “[t]he doctrine leaves much 
to the discretion of the court to which plaintiff resorts.”76 The Court 
did suggest that close cases should be resolved in favor of the plaintiff: 
“[U]nless the balance [of private interest factors] is strongly in favor of 
the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be dis-
turbed.”77 But ultimately, the Court offered a fairly vague standard, 
suggesting that trial judges should choose the forum “where trial will 
best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice.”78 
B. “Demagnetizing” Policies and International Retaliation 
 Given the magnetic effect of U.S. courts and the discretion given to 
trial judges to dismiss cases, scholars like Professor Russell Weintraub 
have identified a need to “demagnetize” U.S. courts.79 Weintraub, a well-
known expert in international litigation, suggests that magnet forums 
may have a responsibility to “examine their rules and procedures and 
                                                                                                                      
73 See id. 
74 See David W. Robertson, The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: “An Object Lesson 
in Uncontrolled Discretion,” 29 Tex. Int’l L.J. 353, 360–62 (1994); Louise Weinberg, Insight 
and Ironies: The American Bhopal Cases, 20 Tex. Int’l L.J. 307, 316–17 (1985). 
75 Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Koster, 330 U.S. at 527. 
79 See Russell J. Weintraub, International Litigation and Arbitration: Prac-
tice and Planning 224 (5th ed. 2006). But see Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum 
Shopping System, 96 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010) (presenting empirical evidence 
“suggesting that there actually has been less, not more, transnational forum shopping into 
U.S. courts over the last two decades,” and concluding that “new anti-forum-shopping 
measures may not be as appropriate or urgent as their advocates suggest—particularly in 
light of the potential costs of such measures”), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1596280. 
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modify those that are luring claimants from forums that are more ap-
propriate for adjudicating the matters in dispute[.]”80 Professor Wein-
truab has recommended changing choice-of-law rules to demagnetize 
U.S. courts, so that foreign tort victims’ compensation would be calcu-
lated by reference to the prevailing standard in their home country.81 
 In the absence of such a choice-of-law regime, however, it is not 
surprising that judges turn to the tools more immediately at hand to 
repel foreign lawsuits—in particular, the judicial doctrines of pruden-
tial standing and forum non conveniens.82 Although categorical exclu-
sion through the doctrine of prudential standing is an extreme de-
magnetizing policy, expansion of the forum non conveniens doctrines 
is a much more common one.83 Two decades ago, a scholar reported 
that the federal courts were experiencing a “dramatic increase in the 
use of forum non conveniens in the last twenty years,” going from ap-
proximately 25 published decisions per decade to or over 100 per dec-
ade, or approximately 10 per year.84 Transnational forum non conven-
iens cases have continued that dramatic increase, going up to approxi-
mately forty-three published decisions per year85—a 400% increase over 
a time period in which civil filings as a category rose only 22%.86 The 
courts have dismissed in approximately half of the most recent cases.87 
 Because a growing number of foreign nations object to the growth 
of such dismissals, they have begun adopting retaliatory blocking stat-
                                                                                                                      
80 See Weintraub, supra note 79. 
81 Russell J. Weintraub, Choice of Law for Products Liability: Demagnetizing the United States 
Forum, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 157, 163 (1999). 
82 See Sinochem Int’l Co., 549 U.S. at 429–30; Doe, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 135. 
83 Weintraub, International Litigation, supra note 21, at 352 (“The United States is a 
magnet forum for the afflicted of the world. The costs of litigating here are lower and the 
recovery is higher. Subjecting United States defendants to suit here by foreigners injured 
abroad places our companies at a world-wide competitive disadvantage. . . . Forum non 
conveniens furthers efficient and fair use of our judicial resources.”). 
84 Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 781, 831 (1985). 
85 Christopher A. Whytock, Politics and the Rule of Law in Transnational Judicial 
Governance: The Case of Forum Non Conveniens 15–16, available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=969033. 
86 Responding to the Growing Need for Federal Judgeships: The Federal Judgeship Act of 2009: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony by George Singal, J., U.S. District Court for the 
District of Maine). 
87 See Whytock, supra note 85, at 16 (reporting a forty-seven percent dismissal rate). A 
review of reported district court cases in 2009 confirmed that just over forty percent of the 
cases were dismissed. See id. at 17, 31. Of these cases, courts dismissed cases involving for-
eign plaintiffs suing U.S. defendants at a notably higher rate than cases involving U.S. 
plaintiffs suing foreign defendants. See id. at 23. 
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utes.88 Many of these statutes, enacted primarily in Latin American 
countries with civil law systems, attempt to prevent forum non conven-
iens dismissals in the United States.89 The statutes generally provide 
that, once a plaintiff has filed suit in a foreign court with jurisdiction, 
the home country’s court loses jurisdiction.90 Although this is a re-
statement of the general principle of lis pendens followed in civil law 
countries, countries enacted the statutes to make clear that their courts 
should not be considered an alternative forum supporting dismissal 
under forum non conveniens.91 Thus, a foreign plaintiff who files first 
in a U.S. court may, by this choice, foreclose jurisdiction in his or her 
home forum—a forum that would have been available had the plaintiff 
sued there initially, but is no longer available once suit is filed in a U.S. 
court possessing jurisdiction over the case.92 This aspect of the statute is 
designed to discourage dismissal from U.S. courts by sending the mes-
sage that “if transnational cases are dismissed [from the U.S.], the for-
eign national-plaintiff may never have relief.”93 
 Defendants themselves may not care if the foreign plaintiff obtains 
relief. Of presumably greater concern to U.S. defendants, however, is 
that some blocking statutes add a provision that acts as a poison pill: 
such provisions allow the national courts to take jurisdiction over cases 
dismissed from U.S. courts, but impose additional disadvantages on 
defendants that “tilt the scales of justice in the plaintiffs’ favor.”94 These 
statutes may, like the one described in the introduction, allow courts to 
assess damages at U.S. levels—and, like the twenty-seven billion dollar 
recommendation in Ecuador, may estimate U.S. damage law more gen-
erously than U.S. courts would.95 Statutes may also require U.S. defen-
dants to post a significant bond, such as 140% of the damages awarded 
                                                                                                                      
88 Bernard H. Oxman, Comments on Forum Non Conveniens Issues in International Cases, 
35 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 123, 128 (2004); see also Winston Anderson, Forum Non 
Conveniens Checkmated?—The Emergence of Retaliatory Legislation, 10 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 
183, 184 (2001); Paul Santoyo, Comment, Bananas of Wrath: How Nicaragua May Have Dealt 
Forum Non Conveniens a Fatal Blow Removing the Doctrine as an Obstacle to Achieving Corporate 
Accountability, 27 Hous. J. Int’l L. 703, 724–26, 735–36 (2005). 
89 Heiser, supra note 18, at 621–34; Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin 
America and Blocking Statutes, 35 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 21, 22–24 (2003). 
90 See Santoyo, supra note 88, at 725. 
91 Saint Dahl, supra note 89, at 25–31. 
92 See Santoyo, supra note 88, at 725. 
93 M. Ryan Casey & Barrett Ristroph, Boomerang Litigation: How Convenient Is Forum Non 
Conveniens in Transnational Litigation?, 4 BYU Int’l L. & Mgmt. Rev. 21, 29 (2007). 
94 Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
95 See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
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in similar cases, or may presume causation in tort cases, requiring the 
defendant to prove that its action did not cause the alleged harm.96 
 Federal courts react to blocking statutes in different ways; some 
will accept them at face value and retain a case, while others will ignore 
them.97 Thus, the use of forum non conveniens dismissals to “demag-
netize” U.S. courts raises a number of unresolved issues: it is not clear 
whether such a policy will actually be effective at pushing litigation into 
other countries’ courts and whether, in the long run, U.S. defendants 
might find themselves facing greater hardships in defending cases out-
side the U.S. than at home. As such, the benefits of a demagnetizing 
policy may outweigh its detriments.98 
 Given the domestic confusion and international reaction to the 
forum non conveniens doctrine, it seems apparent that, although fo-
rum non conveniens plays a growing role in controlling court access, it 
is not serving well as a primary court-access determinant.99 Neverthe-
less, few academics have examined the doctrine’s role in the larger 
question of access to federal court.100 The next Part analyzes court-
access doctrines more generally, separating the prudential and policy 
goals that animate the doctrines and arguing that these conflicting 
goals create chaos, unpredictable rulings, and inefficient judicial ad-
ministration.101 
II. Problematic Judicial Court-Access Doctrines 
 Most court-access restrictions stem from constitutional or legisla-
tive sources: the Constitution sets the outer boundaries of both per-
sonal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction,102 and Congress has 
created additional limitations on subject matter jurisdiction and venue, 
while deferring to additional state-made limitations on personal juris-
diction.103 But judge-made court-access limitations are not uncom-
                                                                                                                      
96 Heiser, supra note 18, at 656–57. 
97 Casey & Ristroph, supra note 93, at 30–31. 
98 See id. 
99 See id. at 26–31. 
100 For two notable exceptions that do address forum non conveniens as part of the 
larger issue of court access, see Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Justice Restored: Using a Preservation-of-
Court-Access Approach to Replace Forum Non Conveniens in Five International Product-Injury Case 
Studies, 24 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 53, 60 (2003) (citing the “shared underpinnings” of fo-
rum non conveniens with legislative jurisdiction and the modern theory of personal juris-
diction), and Stein, supra note 84, at 831. 
101 See infra notes 102–211 and accompanying text. 
102 U.S. Const., art. III; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 741–47 (1877). 
103 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391, 1331, 1332 (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k). 
2010] Transnational Litigation & Institutional Choice 1095 
mon.104 The judiciary developed the doctrine of prudential standing, 
for example, to avoid wasting court time on cases where no individual 
rights would be vindicated and to ensure that “those litigants best 
suited to assert a particular claim” would be the ones heard in court.105 
 These judicial restrictions on court access are typically instrumen-
talist in that they seek to ensure the smooth functioning of the courts. 
Specifically, they are intended to promote better decision making, con-
serve judicial resources, and minimize conflicts between the branches 
of government.106 Thus, for example, prudential doctrines prohibit a 
litigant from “raising another person’s legal rights,” forbid suits based 
on “generalized grievances,” and require that the plaintiff’s complaint 
“fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.”107 In 
adopting these limitations, the judiciary pays heed to the idea of com-
parative institutional competence: as the U.S. Supreme Court has 
noted, these prudential access rules offer a mode of judicial self-
governance, without which “the courts would be called upon to decide 
abstract questions of wide public significance even though other gov-
ernmental institutions may be more competent to address the ques-
tions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to pro-
tect individual rights.”108 
 Many of the commonly stated goals of forum non conveniens fit 
well with other common law doctrines of judicial restraint and defer-
ence.109 The discretionary dismissal power protects judicial functioning 
by combating plaintiffs’ abuse of process,110 guarding overcrowded 
dockets from the incursion of cases unrelated to the forum,111 and de-
                                                                                                                      
104 See Gladstone Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1979) (discussing the 
judge-made doctrine of prudential standing). 
105 Id.; see also Jeffrey Kahn, Zoya’s Standing Problem, or, When Should the Constitution Fol-
low the Flag?, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 673, 673 (2010) (critiquing the “strange but proliferating” 
test of standing). 
106 Joshua L. Sohn, The Case for Prudential Standing, 39 U. Mem. L. Rev. 727, 728 (2009) 
(“[T]he Court has noted how the ‘constitutional’ standing requirements improve judicial 
decision-making, conserve judicial resources, and reduce conflict between the judiciary 
and the political branches. These are all worthy goals, but they are prudential goals, re-
lated to wise and efficient judicial administration.”). 
107 Id. at 732 (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004)). 
108 Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 12. 
109 See infra notes 110–112 and accompanying text. 
110 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (noting that some plaintiffs may 
seek “not simply justice but perhaps justice blended with some harassment”). 
111 Heine v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 50 F.2d 382, 387 (9th Cir. 1931) (stating that the court 
has “the power to prefer resident litigants of the district in access to overcrowded calen-
dars”). 
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ferring to the competence of foreign courts through considerations of 
comity.112 
 But even from an early time, the forum non conveniens doctrine 
has not been limited to these prudential goals; instead, it also captures 
broader policy considerations that could be affected by court access.113 
By assertively dismissing non-forum-related cases, for example, courts 
favor taxpayers whose dollars support court operations.114 On the other 
hand, when broad court access would encourage business and com-
mercial considerations, the courts are less likely to apply the forum non 
conveniens doctrine—thus showing deference to substantive economic 
goals.115 Other policies informally influence the forum non conveniens 
analysis, as dismissing courts sometimes express distaste for contingent-
fee lawyers and for foreign plaintiffs who seek higher damage awards 
than their own countries would be willing to award.116 
 Excluding foreign plaintiffs based on standing similarly evokes both 
prudential and policy considerations.117 By excluding a particular class 
of litigants, the doctrine indeed reduces the administrative burden of 
                                                                                                                      
112 Id. (“Comity between the United States and Germany should also have considera-
tion.”); Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., 184 N.E. 152, 159 (Mass. 1933) 
(“In determining whether to entertain jurisdiction of a cause as matter of comity, courts 
undertake to recognize a state of friendliness and reciprocal desire to do justice existing 
between nations and between the several States of the Union.”). 
113 See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention and 
Progress in National Law, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 203, 212 (2001) (“Ostensibly a tool to imple-
ment litigation convenience for litigants and courts, as formulated by the Supreme Court 
in the 1940’s, forum non conveniens doctrine invited attention to regulatory concerns, 
and hence to choice of law, through consideration of what the Court called ‘public interest 
factors.’”); see also Alexandra Wilson Albright, In Personam Jurisdiction: A Confused and Inap-
propriate Substitute for Forum Non Conveniens, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 351, 398 (1992) (“In making 
decisions about forum non conveniens, the state is making public policy decisions that 
affect the state’s economy as well as the influence that the state’s laws may have in foreign 
countries.”). 
114 See Barrett, supra note 61, at 404; see also One Hundred & Ninety-Four Shawls, 18 F. 
Cas. 703, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1848) (No. 10,521) (concluding that courts should not prioritize 
cases involving litigants “owing no allegiance to its laws, and contributing in no way to its 
support”). 
115 See Barrett, supra note 61, at 405 (noting that New York would allow dismissal for 
forum non conveniens in tort actions but not in commercial actions, because in commer-
cial actions “presumably some benefit will ultimately accrue to the state through encourag-
ing the use of its courts in the furtherance of business activities”). 
116 Heine, 50 F.2d at 387 (noting that the court “no doubt had inherent power to pro-
tect itself from a deluge of litigation by nonresidents, inspired by contingent retainers to 
avoid or overcome foreign laws and interpretation and application thereof by foreign 
courts of the country of the situs of the contract”). 
117 See Kahn, supra note 105, at 673. 
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the courts.118 But the policy questions are even more central: by adopt-
ing such a doctrine, the court is also affecting economic, political, and 
regulatory interests in ways that may have substantial ramifications.119 
 The next Section argues that the competing components of these 
access doctrines must be openly acknowledged and evaluated.120 The 
prudential component serves the goals of fair and efficient adjudication, 
while the policy strand promotes substantive economic and political 
goals.121 The judiciary itself has been inconsistent and often contradic-
tory about what the court access doctrines are intended to accomplish.122 
Until the separate underpinnings of these court-access doctrines are ac-
knowledged, the doctrines will serve neither the prudential nor the pol-
icy goals successfully. 
A. Does the Trial Judge’s Discretion Allow for Retention of Cases? 
 Acknowledging the tension between prudential and policy goals 
would help define the limits of the district court’s power. At this time, it 
is unclear where the limits on discretion fall: specifically, may a judge 
retain a case on the docket even when the forum non conveniens fac-
tors are clearly met? Certainly, the judge would have discretion to dis-
miss the case when the factors are met. But would the judge also have 
discretion to retain the case? 
 Separating the prudential and policy considerations of the doc-
trine is critical to answering this question. If the prudential considera-
tions are paramount, then the judge should indeed possess such discre-
tion; after all, the judge is in the best position to consider the adminis-
trative impact of retaining such a case. If, on the other hand, we expect 
the doctrine to also further substantive policy goals, then retaining the 
case would make no sense: unlike prudential concerns that one can 
reasonably address on a case-by-case basis, meeting policy goals requires 
a stable system in which dismissals can reasonably be predicted. 
 One reason for this lack of clarity regarding the retention power is 
that appellate courts are rarely asked to address a district judge’s refusal 
                                                                                                                      
118 See id. at 718–19 (noting that denying prudential standing for foreign-based takings 
claims may reduce “court clog,” but only at risk of “creat[ing] an arbitrary device to ex-
clude plaintiffs with legitimate claims” and potentially threatening the property interests of 
aliens abroad). 
119 See infra notes 123–142 and accompanying text. 
120 See infra notes 123–142 and accompanying text. 
121 See infra notes 123–142 and accompanying text. 
122 See Born & Rutledge, supra note 20, at 369 (“[T]he forum non conveniens doctrine 
rests on unarticulated and unexamined substantive assumptions.”). 
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to dismiss under forum non conveniens. It is clear that a decision to 
dismiss may be reviewed by higher courts under an “abuse of discretion” 
standard: if the factors do not weigh in favor of dismissal, the district 
court’s decision to dismiss is a final judgment that will be reversed for 
abuse of discretion.123 A decision denying a motion to dismiss, however, 
is more difficult to review: because the decision to retain a case is not a 
final order, it is not immediately appealable as of right.124 Moreover, if 
the defendant does raise the issue after a trial on the merits, many of the 
factors supporting a forum non conveniens dismissal will have become 
moot: whatever inconvenience the parties and court would have suf-
fered from trying the case in a particular forum becomes a sunk cost 
after trial.125 Remanding the case for retrial in a more convenient forum 
would only add to the overall expense and delay of the case.126 
 Because of the rarity of such appeals, a district judge’s decision to 
retain a case is rarely disturbed—even when it conflicts with other 
judges’ decisions. Thus, at a minimum, district judges possess “review-
limiting” discretion to retain cases; that is, “there may be law constrain-
ing the trial court’s decision, but there will be [almost] no appellate 
review of that decision—such discretion ‘gives the trial judge a right to 
be wrong without incurring reversal.’”127 
                                                                                                                      
123 See, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429–30 
(2007) (reviewing a dismissal under forum non conveniens); Synygy, Inc. v. ZS Assocs., 
Inc., No. 08–2355, 2009 WL 1532117, at *2–3 (3d Cir. June 1, 2009) (concluding that the 
district court failed to properly evaluate the availability of the alternative forum); Adelson 
v. Hananel, 510 F.3d 43, 52–54 (1st Cir. 2007) (concluding that the district court afforded 
too much weight to concurrent litigation ongoing in Israel and that it provided insuffi-
cient deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum). 
124 Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1998). Interlocutory review may be 
available by mandamus or through 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)(2006) in exceptional cases. Id. at 
529–30. In addition, a right of interlocutory appellate review could be granted through the 
rulemaking process under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e)(2006). 
125 See Zelinski v. Columbia 300, Inc., 335 F.3d 633, 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The fact that 
the district court tried this case to a conclusion indicates that Zelinski’s forum of choice 
was, if not convenient for Columbia, at least workable. Furthermore, at this point the pub-
lic interest certainly would not be well-served by deciding to jettison the untold hours of 
work put into this case . . . .”); see also Demenus v. Tinton 35, Inc., 873 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir. 
1989) (suggesting that a forum non conveniens motion “fails to survive the mooting effect 
of the actual litigation of the suit in the putative inconvenient forum”). But see Gonzalez v. 
Naviera Neptuno A.A., 832 F.2d 876, 881 (5th Cir. 1987) (reversing, even after trial, the 
lower court’s judgment which had denied a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens 
grounds, and transferring the case to Peru). 
126 See Zelinski, 335 F.3d at 643. 
127 Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judging Jury Verdicts, 83 Tul. L. Rev. 157, 202 (2008) 
(quoting Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 Sy-
racuse L. Rev. 635, 638 (1971)). 
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 But a more difficult question is whether the district judge also pos-
sesses “decision-liberating” discretion to retain a case even when the 
factors would easily permit dismissal. That is, is the court “free to ren-
der the decision it chooses” in such an instance?128 The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s typical phrasing of the forum non conveniens doctrine states 
that 
a federal court has discretion to dismiss a case on the ground 
of forum non conveniens “when an alternative forum has ju-
risdiction to hear [the] case, and . . . trial in the chosen forum 
would establish . . . oppressiveness and vexation to a defen-
dant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff’s convenience, or . . . 
the chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considera-
tions affecting the court’s own administrative and legal prob-
lems.”129 
What is unclear, however, is whether the “discretion” identified by the 
Court means that the judge could, in such instances, choose either to 
retain or dismiss. 
 Conventional wisdom leans toward a substantive view of the doc-
trine, suggesting that a defendant may have a right to dismissal even if 
the trial judge were willing to keep the case.130 Under this view, if the 
stated forum non conveniens factors are satisfied, then a judge’s deci-
sion to retain the case would be an abuse of discretion.131 At one level, 
this makes sense: if the factors truly weigh heavily in favor of permitting 
dismissal, then what reason could the court have for retaining jurisdic-
tion?132 And if indeed the court has no good reason for retaining juris-
diction, but simply does so arbitrarily or capriciously, then the court 
would certainly be abusing its discretion.133 
                                                                                                                      
128 Id. (quoting Rosenberg, supra note 127, at 638). 
129 Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 429. 
130 See Gonzalez, 832 F.2d at 881. 
131 See id. (“[W]e conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in denying 
Neptuno’s motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens. Consequently, the judgment must 
be reversed. Both private and public interests weigh heavily in favor of a Peruvian forum, 
applying Peruvian law.”); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 
809 F.2d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[I]t might reasonably be concluded that it would have 
been an abuse of discretion to deny a forum non conveniens dismissal.”). 
132 See Gonzalez, 832 F. 2d at 881. 
133 See Richards v. United Mine Workers Health & Ret. Fund, 895 F.2d 133, 135–36 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (“Although the ‘abuse of discretion’ standard is perhaps broader and less defer-
ential than the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard, ‘arbitrary and capricious’ definitely is 
encompassed by ‘abuse of discretion.’”). 
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 On the other hand, the source of the dismissal power supports the 
view that prudential considerations should control, and that the judge 
may indeed have such power.134 Unlike personal jurisdiction, which has 
constitutional underpinnings,135 or venue limitations, which are codi-
fied in statute,136 authority for the forum non conveniens doctrine is 
based on the court’s “inherent power.”137 As other commentators have 
noted, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that such inherent power 
should be strictly interpreted, “suggesting that the inherent power ex-
tends only to those instances ‘necessary to permit the courts to func-
tion.’”138 It may be that the courts need the forum non conveniens doc-
trine to function—specifically, to protect their dockets from cases that 
have little connection to the forum and can be more easily resolved 
elsewhere. But if so, a court’s decision not to exercise that outlet in a 
particular case should be respected—even if the case would otherwise 
fit the paradigm for dismissal under forum non conveniens. 
 Thus, when both the Constitution and Congress would permit a 
court to exercise jurisdiction, the court may reasonably decide to retain 
a case that would otherwise qualify for dismissal under forum non con-
veniens.139 Even if the case has little connection to the forum, the court 
may believe that it can still manage its docket while hearing the case, 
and may reasonably defer to Congress’s choice to allow jurisdiction.140 
If the power to dismiss a case under forum non conveniens is truly 
based on the court’s inherent power, then it is not unreasonable to view 
                                                                                                                      
134 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (“In addition, it is firmly estab-
lished that ‘[t]he power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts.’ This power 
reaches both conduct before the court and that beyond the court's confines . . . . Of par-
ticular relevance here, the inherent power also allows a federal court to vacate its own 
judgment upon proof that a fraud has been perpetrated upon the court.” (citations omit-
ted)). 
135 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 741–47. 
136 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2006). 
137 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (“There are other facets to a federal court’s inherent 
power. The court may bar from the courtroom a criminal defendant who disrupts a trial. It 
may dismiss an action on grounds of forum non conveniens, and it may act sua sponte to dis-
miss a suit for failure to prosecute.”) (citations omitted); see also Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, 
the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 
Iowa L. Rev. 1147, 1159–66 (2006); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal 
Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 735, 743 (2001). 
138 Lear, supra note 137, at 1160 (quoting Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils 
S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 819–20 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
139 See Lear, supra note 137, at 1160–62. 
140 See id. Indeed, some scholars have argued that deference to Congress is required, 
and that current forum non conveniens doctrine impermissibly encroaches on areas of 
exclusive Congressional control. See id. and sources cited therein. 
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such power as a one-way safety valve: the court may override Congress’s 
grant of jurisdiction when, under its inherent power, the court finds 
dismissal to be necessary; if the court concludes that it can function 
without such a dismissal, however, it is not obligated to dismiss even 
when it would have authority to do so. 
 It might be reasonable to defer to the judge’s retention power, but 
this view is far from universal. Although most decisions to retain cases 
evade appellate review, a few courts have reached out, either through 
interlocutory review before trial or even post-trial, to hold that a court 
abuses its discretion by retaining a case eligible for forum non conven-
iens dismissal.141 These courts thus treat the doctrine as a substantive 
one that protects defendants’ rights, rather than a prudential doctrine 
that protects the functioning of the courts.142 
B. May a Foreign Plaintiff Intentionally Foreclose an  
“Adequate Alternative Forum”? 
 The prudential-policy distinction is also apparent when courts 
must decide how to address the effects of plaintiffs’ forum choices. The 
prudential side of the doctrine allows a court to decide which of two 
available courts is better suited to hear the case. What happens, how-
ever, when the plaintiff could have filed suit in a more appropriate fo-
rum, but chose not to and thereby “closed” the formerly available fo-
rum? At this point, the U.S. court no longer has the ability to choose 
between two forums—the prudential option of sending the case to a 
better decisionmaker is closed.143 All that is left is the policy question: 
should the court dismiss the case to incentivize future plaintiffs to make 
                                                                                                                      
141 See Gonzalez, 832 F.2d at 881 (reversing, even after trial, the lower court’s judgment 
which denied a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds and transferring the 
case to Peru); see also Union Carbide Corp., 809 F.2d at 202 (“[I]t might reasonably be con-
cluded that it would have been an abuse of discretion to deny a forum non conveniens 
dismissal.”). 
142 Nalls v. Rolls-Royce, Ltd., 702 F.2d 255, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wilkey, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc) (stating that forum non conveniens protects “the right 
not to be tried in an unreasonably inconvenient forum,” and comparing it to the “district 
court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds”); Christina Melady 
Morin, Note, Review and Appeal of Forum Non Conveniens and Venue Transfer Orders, 59 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 715, 729 (1991) (“Both forum non conveniens and venue transfer protect 
the defendant from proceeding to trial in an unreasonably inconvenient forum.”). 
143 Saint Dahl, supra note 89, at 22–24.  As discussed further in this Section, alternative 
forums might become unavailable for different reasons: civil law countries may divest ju-
risdiction of other courts after a case has been filed in a court possessed of jurisdiction, 
and the statute of limitations may be shorter in one forum than in another. See supra notes 
155–165 and accompanying text. 
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more appropriate forum choices, even though the current plaintiffs 
have no such option? 
 The discord over this question arises from a changing conception 
of the role that the “alternative forum” concept should play in a forum 
non conveniens analysis.144 Originally, the doctrine was conceived as a 
way to steer cases away from a vexatious or abusive forum and into a 
more convenient one.145 Courts later transformed it into a doctrine 
aimed at choosing the most suitable forum, regardless of whether the 
original forum was vexatious or not.146 Using the doctrine to shape liti-
gant forum choice at the outset would effect an even more fundamen-
tal change, transforming the forum non conveniens doctrine from one 
that merely steers litigation to an appropriate forum into one that at-
tempts to regulate litigant behavior. 
 This shift has not fully taken hold; the traditional view, which re-
quires that the adequate alternative forum actually be available at the 
time of dismissal, is still prominent at this time.147 If the statute of limi-
tations is likely to be a problem in the alternative forum, courts follow-
ing this doctrine often condition dismissal on the defendant’s willing-
ness to waive it.148 Because the traditional view requires that an alterna-
tive forum be available to take the case, it does not inquire into the 
                                                                                                                      
144 See infra notes 145–181 and accompanying text. 
145 See Robertson, supra note 4, at 404–05. 
146 Id. 
147 See Crimson Semiconductor, Inc. v. Electronum, 629 F. Supp. 903, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986) (“Many cases have held that statute of limitations bars arising after the instigation of 
a lawsuit preclude a forum non conveniens dismissal. Yet our research uncovers only one case 
discussing the adequacy of a forum in which the claim would have been stale when 
brought.”); Born & Rutledge, supra note 20, at 415 (“The weight of authority . . . imposes 
an absolute requirement that an adequate alternative forum exist.”); Heiser, supra note 18 
at 624 (“Under the traditional common law doctrine set forth in [Gulf Oil] and [Piper 
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981)] and followed in federal and most state courts, a 
court must first ascertain whether an adequate alternative forum is available when deter-
mining whether a forum non conveniens dismissal is appropriate. If the law in the alterna-
tive country prohibits jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim when the plaintiff first files in 
another country with competent jurisdiction, then the alternative forum is simply not 
available to the plaintiff.”); Rajeev Muttreja, Note, How To Fix the Inconsistent Application of 
Forum Non Conveniens to Latin American Jurisdiction—And Why Consistency May Not Be Enough, 
83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1607, 1638 (2008). 
148 14D Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 3828.3 (3d ed. 2007) (“A motion to dismiss for forum non 
conveniens will not be granted unless the district court is convinced that an alternative 
forum exists in which the action can be brought.”). 
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reasons for a forum’s unavailability.149 Thus, under the traditional view, 
blocking statutes that preclude jurisdiction abroad would be effective: a 
statute destroying all other jurisdiction as soon as the case is filed in a 
court of proper jurisdictionthe statutes would be considered in the 
dismissal analysis, and the U.S. court would keep the case if it con-
cludes that, in light of the statute, there is no alternative forum.150 
 Nevertheless, a modern trend is emerging in which a growing 
number of courts will dismiss a case—even in the absence of an alterna-
tive forum—when it appears that the foreign forum is unavailable as a 
result of plaintiffs’ early choices in litigation.151 In the 2005 U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit case In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 
for example, a district court had declined to hear a tort case against a 
U.S. corporation, concluding that Mexico was an adequate alternative 
forum.152 The plaintiff, however, had also filed suit in Mexico, and a 
Mexican court had dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.153 The 
Seventh Circuit remanded the case, holding that the district court 
should inquire into the nature of that dismissal: if the plaintiffs had 
acted in bad faith by purposefully filing in the wrong Mexican state, 
then the district court should feel free to dismiss for forum non con-
veniens, as “a forum may not become unavailable by way of fraud.”154 
 The enactment of blocking statutes significantly increases the like-
lihood that courts will have to decide what effect to give to the plain-
tiff’s initial forum choice.155 When another’s country’s statute attempts 
to limit its own courts’ jurisdiction in an effort to shift the litigation to 
the United States, U.S. courts must decide how to react: accept the limi-
tation and hear the case, or reject the limitation and refuse the case? 
                                                                                                                      
149 See Heiser, supra note 18, at 626 (“The relevant inquiry under the current forum 
non conveniens analysis is whether an alternative forum is in fact available, not why the al-
ternative forum is unavailable.”). 
150 See id. 
151 See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 420 F.3d 702, 703 (7th Cir. 2005); Veba-
Chemie A.G. v. M/V Getafix, 711 F.2d 1243, 1248 n.10 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Perhaps if the 
plaintiff’s plight is of his own making—for instance, if the alternative forum was no longer 
available at the time of dismissal as a result of the deliberate choice of an inconvenient 
forum—the court would be permitted to disregard [the available forum requirement] and 
dismiss. As we have pointed out, forum non conveniens is sensitive to plaintiff’s motive for 
choosing his forum, at least in the extreme case where his selection is designed to ‘vex, 
harass, or oppress the defendant.’”). 
152 420 F.3d at 703. 
153 Id. at 705. 
154 Id. at 707. 
155 See Oxman, supra note 88, at 128; see also Anderson, supra note 88 at 184 (2001); 
Santoyo, supra note 88, 724–25 (2005). 
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Federal courts have gone both ways.156 Courts may view such statutes as 
an encroachment on their judicial power,157 but a judicial rejection of 
the foreign statutes would extend well beyond the judicial sphere, af-
fecting foreign relations and regulatory goals.158 
 Even in the absence of a blocking statute, plaintiffs’ litigation 
choices may foreclose an alternative forum and require the court to 
make a decision about whether to allow access to the U.S. court.159 For 
example, in In re Compania Naviera Johnna S.A., decided in 2007 by the 
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, the 
plaintiff deliberately chose not to file suit in China, knowing that the 
Chinese statute of limitations would expire before the U.S. court ruled 
on the forum non conveniens motion.160 The district court decided 
that dismissal was appropriate even though the Chinese forum was no 
longer available to the plaintiff, stating that “[i]f a plaintiff (or other 
party opposed to forum non conveniens dismissal) purposefully fore-
closed the availability of an alternative forum, that conduct would cer-
tainly be in the realm of vexation, harassment, or oppression.”161 
 District courts have also occasionally allowed dismissal when the 
alternative forum was lost due to mere inaction rather than a particular 
intent to preclude a forum non conveniens dismissal.162 In the 2001 
case of Gamara v. Alamo Rent a Car in the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of New York, Canadian plaintiffs sued a number of de-
fendants, including a U.S. car rental company.163 The district court, in 
dismissing for forum non conveniens, noted the expiration of the Can-
dian statute of limitations meant that a Canadian forum was no longer 
available to the plaintiff, but nonetheless concluded that because the 
claims “could have been brought in Canada,” Canada was an adequate 
alternative forum.164 Similarly, in 1985 in Castillo v. Shipping Corp. of In-
                                                                                                                      
156 Casey & Ristroph, supra note 93, at 30. 
157 Hal S. Scott, What to Do About Foreign Discriminatory Forum Non Conveniens Legislation, 
49 Harv. Int’l L.J. Online 95 (2009) (“[C]ourts would be succumbing to efforts to ma-
nipulate their jurisdiction. . . . [T]he United States should not reward foreign plaintiffs 
with U.S. jurisdiction when a country passes laws that discriminate against U.S. compa-
nies.”). 
158 See infra notes 182--209 and 217--225 and accompanying text. 
159 In re Compania Naviera Joanna S.A., 531 F. Supp. 2d 680, 686 (D.S.C. 2007). 
160 See id. 
161 See id. 
162 See, e.g., Gamara v. Alamo Rent a Car, No. 99-Civ-411, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1146, at 
*1 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2001); Castillo v. Shipping Corp. of India, 606 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985). 
163 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1146, at *1–2. 
164 Id. at *4. 
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dia, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York stated that “[t]he plaintiff had a most convenient forum, the Do-
minican Republic. But, through his own inaction, he lost access to it. 
He let the Dominican Republic’s six-month statute of limitations pass 
and has lost his remedy there.”165 
 Thus, courts are in fundamental disagreement about whether they 
should take into account the reason for a forum’s unavailability in de-
ciding whether to dismiss.166 Like the question of a district court’s power 
to retain a case when the factors warrant dismissal,167 the answer to this 
question depends on which of the theoretical strands underlying the 
forum non conveniens doctrine—prudence or policy—is paramount. 
Specifically, is the doctrine one that can, or should, shape conduct? Or 
is the doctrine merely a prudential and adjudicatory one, making the 
best forum choice only after the plaintiffs have played their hand?168 
 Allowing the forum non conveniens doctrine to play a larger regu-
latory role is attractive to judges who wish to reduce the magnet effect 
of U.S. courts.169 If plaintiffs understand that, by choosing to file suit in 
the United States, they may be foreclosing other options, then they will 
be forced to determine whether the risk of dismissal in the United 
States outweighs a lower recovery in a more appropriate forum.170 If 
the alternative forum truly offers the possibility of recovery (even if at a 
lower rate), then economic theory would suggest that the pull of the 
United States would diminish as some plaintiffs conclude that the risk 
of dismissal in the United States outweighs the lower recovery they may 
see in the alternate forum.171 
 In order to make a rational-choice calculation, however, litigants 
would need to have accurate information about the risk of dismissal in 
                                                                                                                      
165 Castillo, 606 F. Supp. at 503–04. 
166 See supra notes 143–165 and accompanying text. 
167 See supra notes 123–142 and accompanying text. 
168 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons, and Organizations: A Legal Theory 
for a Bureaucratic Society 124 (1985) (describing a regulatory model of adjudication 
that focuses on the lawsuit’s “impact on the future conduct of others” and an arbitration 
model that focuses on “settling disputes between private parties”)(quoting Kenneth E. 
Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 937, 938 (1975)). 
169 See supra notes 79--101 and accompanying text. 
170 See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1051, 1055 (2000). 
171 Id. (“To speak coherently of the legal implications of viewing law as a series of in-
centives, analysts have to make assumptions about the consequences of those incentives to 
the people subject to the legal system.”). 
1106 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:1081 
a U.S. court.172 Yet right now, as the Supreme Court has pointed out, 
the doctrine is applied far too inconsistently for any such calculation to 
be made, suggesting that forum non conveniens—at least under cur-
rent practice—is incapable of effectively regulating litigants’ behav-
ior.173 In the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in American Dredging 
Co. v. Miller, Justice Scalia wrote that “forum non conveniens cannot really 
be relied upon in making decisions about secondary conduct—in decid-
ing, for example, where to sue or where one is subject to being sued.”174 
The Court referenced the great discretion that district judges have in 
deciding whether to dismiss, combined with the “multifariousness of 
the factors relevant to its application.”175 In doing so, the Court con-
cluded that these issues “make uniformity and predictability of out-
come almost impossible” and mean that “one can rarely count on the 
fact that jurisdiction will be declined.”176 
 The Supreme Court’s statement that a litigant cannot “count on” a 
decision declining jurisdiction is at odds with certain lower court deci-
sions, where courts have held that a plaintiff should have foreseen a 
forum non conveniens dismissal and, therefore, should be held ac-
countable for their decision not to file suit elsewhere—even if that 
means that they lose their opportunity to bring suit at all.177 The state-
ment also conflicts with a commentator’s suggestion that malpractice 
liability could arise from a lawyer’s failure to predict that a U.S. court 
would dismiss for forum non conveniens178—if, as suggested above, the 
trial judges always maintain discretion to retain a case, then predicting 
dismissal would be speculative at best.179 
 Without such predictability, forum non conveniens cannot act as an 
effective demagnetizing mechanism. It may well be that court-access pol-
icy should not include demagnetization as a goal.180 But if it is a goal, 
                                                                                                                      
172 Id. at 1084 (“In a world in which the consequences of most decisions are, to some 
degree, uncertain, actors can maximize the expected utility of a given decision only if their 
judgments are based on accurate perceptions of the likelihood that specific choices will 
lead to various possible outcomes.”). 
173 See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Oxman, supra note 88, at 129 n.12 (“An attorney may be liable for malpractice for 
advising a plaintiff to sue in the United States without considering the possibility of a fo-
rum non conveniens dismissal in the United States notwithstanding blocking statutes or 
similar rules overseas.”). 
179 See supra notes 123–142 and accompanying text. 
180 See supra notes 217–225 and accompanying text. 
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then it will be necessary to sacrifice some of the discretionary nature of 
the dismissal decision and, instead, develop a legal doctrine more capa-
ble of standardization and subject to review by appellate courts.181 
C. Is There a National Interest in Adjudicating the Conduct of Domestic 
Corporations Abroad? 
 The expansion of the prudential standing and forum non conven-
iens doctrines also raises the question of whether—or to what extent— 
the U.S. has an interest in adjudicating the conduct of domestic corpo-
rations abroad.182 Courts applying both doctrines have suggested that 
there is no such interest, and thus no countervailing policy considera-
tion that would weigh against a dismissal based on administrative con-
venience. This view is shortsighted. 
 As currently applied, the forum non conveniens doctrine requires 
courts to consider the interests of both the target forum and the poten-
tial alternative forum in the subject matter of the lawsuit.183 This in-
quiry is similar to the one undertaken in the choice-of-law context, 
where courts must decide whether the U.S. regulatory interest allows 
U.S. law to be applied.184 In cases brought by foreign plaintiffs against 
                                                                                                                      
181 See supra notes 212–275 and accompanying text. 
182 See infra notes 183–209 and accompanying text. Although this Section focuses on 
national interests, other scholars have convincingly argued that federal judicial court-
access policies have also ignored individual state regulatory interests. See Elizabeth T. Lear, 
Federalism, Forum Shopping, and the Foreign Injury Paradox, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 87, 141 
(2009) (“[F]ederal judicial oversight of international forum shopping is incompatible with 
the critical goals of American federalism. Simply put, the forum non conveniens regime 
interferes with the states’ ability to govern.”); Stein, supra note 84, at 843. 
183 Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6. Courts consider the “local interest in having local-
ized controversies decided at home.” Id. (quoting Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509). Courts also 
consider “the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.” Id. 
184 Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice Of Law: The Impact of Applying For-
eign Law in Transnational Tort Actions, 51 Wayne L. Rev. 1161, 1179 (2005) (“[M]uch of the 
interest-balancing undertaken for purposes of forum non conveniens is similar to the 
analysis required by many modern choice-of-law doctrines. For example, when a trial court 
compares the deterrence and the regulatory interests of the country in which a defendant 
manufacturer resides versus those of the country where the injured plaintiff resides for 
purposes of forum non conveniens, that process of identifying and assessing respective 
interests is not unlike a government interest choice-of-law analysis.”); Allan R. Stein, Per-
sonal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of Regulatory Precision, 98 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 411, 416–417 (2004) (“The act of interpreting and applying a legal stan-
dard is an important aspect of providing a legal rule. Where a state’s legislature may pro-
vide a general standard of conduct, the state’s judges and juries give particular meaning to 
that standard through adjudication. Issuance of a judgment, whether exonerating or im-
posing liability on a defendant, affects the primary behavior of people. It is part of the way 
a state crafts a legal order. Accordingly, both jurisdiction and choice of law advance a 
 
1108 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:1081 
U.S. defendants in U.S. courts, these public interest factors take on 
added significance. Because the defendant corporations are sued in 
their home country, the private interest convenience factors weigh less 
heavily, as it is questionable how much inconvenience U.S. corporate 
defendants face in litigating in their home country.185 Thus, analysis of 
the public interest factors assumes greater significance—but not, unfor-
tunately, greater consistency. 
 In order to weigh the public interest factors, courts must decide 
what the United States’ interest is in cases involving lawsuits brought by 
foreign plaintiffs for the conduct of U.S. corporations in their coun-
tries. Jurisprudence in this area has been particularly inconsistent and 
unclear. 
 One view is that “injuries done by American businesses to foreign 
nationals abroad are not America’s problem.”186 Although it is not clear 
how many judges subscribe to this view, it has been clearly articulated 
on occasion: one judge, for example, has asked “why the American jus-
tice system should undertake to punish American corporations more 
severely for their actions in a foreign country than that country 
does?”187 Indeed, a number of courts have quickly brushed aside the 
suggestion that a corporate defendant’s home base has a significant 
interest in its actions abroad.188 Even the U.S. Supreme Court, in its 
1981 decision in Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, was unpersuaded that the United 
States’ interest in deterring the sale of harmful products outweighed 
                                                                                                                      
state’s regulatory interest.”); Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of 
Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 719, 723–25 (2009). 
185 See Tech. Dev. Co. v. Onischenko, 174 Fed. Appx. 117, 122 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Most fo-
rum non conveniens cases involve a defendant, sued far from home, arguing against being 
forced to litigate in a remote forum. Here, by contrast, Onischenko was sued in his own 
forum and is arguing that it would be more convenient for him to defend himself thou-
sands of miles away.”); Monegro v. Rosa, 211 F.3d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[F]oreign 
plaintiffs seeking to avoid their home forums by filing in the United States do not typically 
sue in a forum with little or no relation to either the defendant or the action. Indeed, for-
eign plaintiffs typically bring such suits in the quintessentially convenient forum for the 
defendant—the defendant’s home forum.”); Robertson, supra note 4, at 405 (“[I]t should 
ordinarily be impossible for such a defendant [sued at home] to make a credible claim of 
vexation or harassment.”); see also Alejandro M. Garro, Forum Non Conveniens: “Availability” 
and “Adequacy” of Latin American Fora from a Comparative Perspective, 35 U. Miami Inter-Am. 
L. Rev. 65, 99 (2003–2004) (“[I[f there is a forum that can hardly be deemed ‘inconven-
ient’ to the defendants, that is the court of their own home.”). 
186 Robertson, supra note 4, at 405. 
187 Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 707 n.11 (Tex. 1990) (Hecht, 
J., dissenting). 
188 See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 260–61; Villar v. Crowley Mar. Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1467, 
1485 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (“[B]eyond the general fact that CMC does business in Texas, the 
State of Texas has no interest in this case . . . .”). 
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Scotland’s interest in a products liability case where the harm occurred 
in Scotland.189 
 Another view, however, is that “injuries done by American busi-
nesses to foreign nationals abroad” clearly are “America’s problem” 
when those injuries create economic and political consequences that 
resonate within the United States.190 
1. Economic Interests 
 Contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Piper Aircraft, 
scholars have concluded that the United States does have a strong in-
terest in deterring the sale of harmful products abroad—at least when 
the case involves liability for a product or activity also present in the 
U.S. market.191 If the U.S. tort system is supposed to place the cost of 
defective products on the manufacturer, then it is important that those 
costs be accurately measured. To the extent that harm caused abroad is 
not figured into those costs, the manufacturer can “absorb significant 
costs associated with American accidents before the combined foreign 
and domestic losses mandate a design change or the withdrawal of the 
product from the American market.”192 Thus, U.S. corporations may 
“avoid internalizing all of the costs imposed on others by their product, 
which in turn skews economic incentives to make the product or activ-
ity safer.”193 Professor Elizabeth Lear cites this phenomenon in explain-
ing why a U.S. corporation, facing complaints from Latin American 
plaintiffs, had offered a safer product in Latin America years before 
changing its United States product: 
That same year, after 100 deaths and 400 accidents in Vene-
zuela, Ecuador, and Colombia, Ford replaced the tires and 
fixed the suspensions on all Ford Explorers in those countries. 
Yet neither Bridgestone nor Ford initiated an American recall 
until August 2000, and then only after the large number of 
                                                                                                                      
189 454 U.S. at 260–61 (“Respondent argues that American citizens have an interest in 
ensuring that American manufacturers are deterred from producing defective products, 
and that additional deterrence might be obtained if Piper and Hartzell were tried in the 
United States, where they could be sued on the basis of both negligence and strict liability. 
However, the incremental deterrence that would be gained if this trial were held in an 
American court is likely to be insignificant.”). 
190 See infra notes 191–209 and accompanying text. 
191 See Lear, supra note 26, at 574; see also Alan O. Sykes, Transnational Forum Shopping as 
a Trade and Investment Issue, 37 J. Legal Stud. 339, 342 (2008). 
192 Lear, supra note 26, at 574. 
193 Id. 
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lawsuits filed in the United States attracted the attention of 
the American press. In the deterrence calculus, it was appar-
ently cost effective for Ford and Bridgestone to continue of-
fering products they knew to be dangerous, even fatal, in the 
United States for at least seven years, and more importantly, 
for three years after a significant number of injuries had oc-
curred overseas.194 
 Thus, the United States may very well retain a strong interest in 
deterring U.S. corporations from selling harmful products abroad; 
when manufacturers sell those same products in the United States, they 
have less incentive to ensure their safety for the U.S. market.195 Al-
though U.S. damages are intended to deter the sales of harmful prod-
ucts, companies who sell worldwide may be able to internalize the harm 
caused in the American market—they profit from selling the harmful 
product worldwide, but pay significant damages only when Americans 
are injured.196 The profits from the sale elsewhere may be sufficient to 
absorb the costs of American injuries.197 
2. Political Interests 
 Economic concerns may also merge with political concerns in the 
foreign policy arena. It makes sense that countries such as Ecuador 
would protest when their citizens are unable to sue U.S. corporations in 
U.S. courts. The higher damage awards available in the United States, 
as well as the simplicity of enforcing a judgment in the defendant’s 
home state (where assets likely reside), benefits the injured plaintiffs’ 
home country as well as the plaintiffs themselves. 
 One such benefit of a higher damage award may be a reduced de-
pendency on the government itself. Damage awards in the United States 
are higher than in other countries, in part because U.S. damage awards 
must substitute for the social safety net that exists in a number of other 
countries.198 In many countries, lower damage awards are offset by gov-
                                                                                                                      
194 Id. at 576. 
195 Id. 574–76. 
196 See id. 
197 Id. at 574. 
198 Weintraub, Dispute Resolution, supra note 21, at 213; Julius Jurianto, Forum Non 
Conveniens: Another Look at Conditional Dismissals, 83 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 369, 404 (2006) 
(“The possibility to obtain larger damages in the United States is also due to the fact that 
the amount of the damage award is likely to be keyed to the higher living standards but 
lower social safety net in the United States.”). 
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ernment-funded health care and other benefits.199 Thus, when U.S. 
corporations injure foreign nationals, requiring the foreign plaintiffs to 
sue in their home country works an injustice on that nation. The corpo-
ration is not liable for the full harm it caused; instead, the foreign state 
picks up some of the expense through added burdens on the public fisc. 
Although some countries may decide that the benefits of foreign in-
vestment outweigh any such risk,200 others may disagree.201 
 Even when the country’s social safety net itself is limited or non-
existent, the country’s government may still benefit from its citizens’ 
access to higher damage awards, either through the financial benefit of 
tax payments or through more indirect benefits of an increased stan-
dard of living. In such a situation, it is easy to understand why other 
nations may object to forum non conveniens dismissals of cases 
brought by their citizens. Expecting those nations to change their own 
court systems to award higher damages to all classes of plaintiffs is un-
realistic; a state that has made a policy choice to enact a social safety net 
is unlikely to shift responsibility to the civil justice system for the sole 
reason of combatting United States dismissals. More realistically, such a 
state will instead enact a more targeted blocking statute, or perhaps 
allow U.S.-level damages in cases dismissed from U.S. courts.202 
                                                                                                                      
199 Diane P. Wood, Commentary on The Futures Problem, by Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., 148 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1933, 1940 (2000) (“[M]any of the problems in tort law that bedevil the 
United States do not arise at all in Europe, and other problems are far less pressing, for 
the simple reason that [most of] the European countries have national health insurance 
systems, as well as other national ‘safety net’ payments. The individual who needs sustained 
medical care because of asbestos-caused emphysema, or exposure to HIV-tainted blood, or 
anything else, will get it from the state; the need to find someone else to foot crushing 
hospital and doctor’s bills is different by orders of magnitude.”). 
200 See Malcolm J. Rogge, Towards Transnational Corporate Accountability in the Global 
Economy: Challenging the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in In re: Union Carbide, Alfaro, 
Sequihua, and Aguinda, 36 Tex. Int’l L.J. 299, 314 (2001) (“[G]overnments in both rich 
and poor nations compete in a ‘race to the bottom’ to attract needed foreign invest-
ment.”). 
201 Christopher M. Marlowe, Comment, Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals and the Ade-
quate Alternative Forum Question: Latin America, 32 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 295, 316 
n.102 (2001) (“The Ecuadorian government, concerned with the [Chevron] lawsuit’s po-
tential impact on foreign investment, first objected to U.S. jurisdiction over the case. Upon 
a political shift in government, Ecuador offered to conditionally relinquish its sovereign 
immunity and thus assist plaintiffs in pursuing their claims against Texaco.”). 
202 Brand & Jablonski, supra note 9, at 132–39; Dante Figueroa, Conflicts of Jurisdiction 
Between the United States and Latin America in the Context of Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals, 
37 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 119, 156 (2005). 
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 Even in the absence of a specific blocking statute, there may be 
foreign policy implications.203 The political history of the Americas is 
marked, first by conquest and imperialism as the Spanish explorers 
searched for gold centuries ago, and later by economic and political 
domination by the United States.204 The long history of exploitation 
remains salient in the Latin American political consciousness, and cre-
ates skepticism toward the motives of the U.S. government and of mul-
tinational corporations.205 Given the differences in history and experi-
ence, it is not surprising that a U.S. citizen and an Ecuadorian citizen 
might view a case dismissal quite differently.206 Thus, although a U.S. 
judge might view the decision as necessary to avoid hearing a case that 
truly belongs elsewhere,207 the Ecuadorian citizen might view that same 
dismissal as a partisan decision allowing U.S. corporations the chance 
to operate with impunity in foreign lands.208 Such a view could result in 
favoring foreign investment or trade from non-U.S. corporations, a de-
cision that would have a significant effect on the United States both 
economically and politically.209 
                                                                                                                      
203 See, e.g., Samuel P. Baumgartner, Is Transnational Litigation Different?, 25 U. Pa. J. 
Int’l Econ. L. 1297, 1369 (2004) (noting that procedural reformists need to “act in 
awareness of the complex interdependence between transnational actors and the law ap-
plicable to them,” or risk unwanted foreign policy ramifications and “unintentionally sup-
porting patterns of individual and group behavior they may not wish to condone”). 
204 Sukanya Pillay, Absence of Justice: Lessons from the Bhopal Union Carbide Disaster for Latin 
America, 14 Mich. St. J. Int’l L. 479, 482 (2006); Anne McClintock, The Angel of Progress: 
Pitfalls of the Term “Post-Colonialism”, 10 Soc. Text 84, 89 (1992)(“‘Post-colonial’ Latin Amer-
ica has been invaded by the United States over a hundred times . . . . [W]hile Latin America 
hand-picked bananas for the United States, the United States hand-picked dictators for Latin 
America.”); Ralph R. Reiland, Nothing “Spiritual” About Imperialism, Pittsburgh Trib. Rev. 
(May 27, 2002), available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/opinion/col- 
umnists/reiland/s_510026.html. 
205 Pillay, supra note 204, at 482. 
206 Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Naïve Cynicism: Maintaining False Perceptions in Pol-
icy Debates, 58 Emory L.J. 499, 518–19 (2008)(citing Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, 
They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. Abnormal & Soc. Psychol. 129, 133–34 (1954) (“We 
can watch a football game, a person eating a hamburger, or a couple arguing as if these are 
‘things’ that are ‘out there’ to be viewed in one way; and yet what we ‘see’ is significantly 
determined by influences beyond our conscious purview.”)). 
207 See, e.g., DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 902 (3d Cir. 1977) (using the 
phrase “social jingoism”); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 
867 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (concluding that retaining a suit arising from a gas plant disaster in 
India would amount to imperialism). 
208 See Pillay, supra note 204, at 517 (“Although TNCs [transnational corporations] can 
make significant contributions to development, the potential for human rights violations 
by TNCs is great. The Union Carbide tragedy in India remains an outstanding and terrible 
example of TNC impunity.”). 
209 Pillay, supra note 204, at 517; Georges Fauriol & Sidney Weintraub, U.S. Policy, Bra-
zil, and the Southern Cone, Wash. Q., Summer 1995, at 125. 
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D. Prudence and Policy in the Court-Access Doctrines 
 The judiciary developed prudential court-access doctrines to en-
sure that the administration of justice would function smoothly—to 
channel cases to convenient forums, to allow courts some discretion to 
dismiss cases brought for vexation and harassment, and to create a 
safety valve that would allow dismissal of cases that might overwhelm 
the court or embroil it in issues best handled by another institution.210 
 In transnational cases involving foreign plaintiffs, however, these 
access doctrines have expanded in an attempt to shape substantive 
rights and policy, not just to meet prudential goals. Because this shift has 
remained unexamined and unacknowledged, it has created a mass of 
doctrinal confusion and inconsistent application. It is unclear whether a 
judge who wishes to retain a case on the docket may do so even if the 
forum non conveniens factors point to dismissal. Furthermore, courts 
disagree about whether the forum non conveniens doctrine is intended 
to regulate litigation behavior or whether it is merely intended to adju-
dicate whether one forum is more suitable than another. Courts that 
accept the doctrine as a means of regulation will freely dismiss cases 
when the plaintiff’s own conduct has led to the unavailability of another 
forum. Courts and commentators also disagree over the effects of the 
court-access doctrines; in particular, they disagree about whether dis-
missing cases arising from the foreign conduct of domestic corporations 
will have problematic effects. Some view such dismissals as respectful of 
other nations’ sovereignty and a natural response to an attempt to find 
the most suitable forum.211 This view, however, does not account for ei-
ther the potential economic and foreign policy ramifications of such 
dismissals or the protests that other nations have lodged against such 
dismissals. 
 Accepting that the theoretical underpinnings of these court-access 
doctrines have expanded from prudential administration to encompass 
policy goals allows those goals to be better evaluated. The next Section 
begins that process of evaluation by considering the competing goals 
and choices underlying the question of transnational court access and 
which institutions are best suited to develop that policy. 
                                                                                                                      
210 See supra notes 104–108. 
211 See Union Carbide, 634 F. Supp. at 867 (“In the Court’s view, to retain the litigation in 
this forum, as plaintiffs request, would be yet another example of imperialism, another 
situation in which an established sovereign inflicted its rules, its standards and values on a 
developing nation.”). 
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III. Comparative Institutional Choice 
 A number of commentators have argued for particular refine-
ments of the forum non conveniens doctrine, any one of which would 
likely improve the current incoherent state of the law in this area.212 
Thus far, recent scholarship on transnational court access has largely 
assumed that the judiciary—and typically at the district-court level— 
should be the primary agent of reform.213 This focus on a single institu-
tion, however, is at odds with the larger academic move toward com-
parative institutional analysis, which addresses not only what changes 
should be made to legal rules, but also who should make them: it ana-
lyzes which institution is the most appropriate vehicle for legal re-
form.214 Institutional choice both affects and is affected by goal choice; 
social goals and institutions are “inextricably related.”215 As a result, re-
forming transnational court access requires attention both to the goals 
underlying the doctrine and to the institution or institutions best capa-
ble of meeting them. Institutional choice theory suggests that the goals 
                                                                                                                      
212 Alan Reed, To Be or Not to Be: The Forum Non Conveniens Performance Acted Out on An-
glo-American Courtroom Stage, 29 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 31, 60 (2000); John R. Wilson, 
Coming to America to File Suit: Foreign Plaintiffs and the Forum Non Conveniens Barrier in Trans-
national Litigation, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 659, 690–95 (2004); Jeffrey E. Baldwin, Note, Interna-
tional Human Rights Plaintiffs and the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 40 Cornell Int’l 
L.J. 749, 779–80 (2007); Daniel J. Dorward, Comment, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine 
and the Judicial Protection of Multinational Corporations from Forum Shopping Plaintiffs, 19 U. Pa. 
J. Int’l Econ. L. 141, 161–64 (1998); Jacqueline Duval-Major, Note, One-Way Ticket Home: 
The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 77 Cornell L. 
Rev. 650, 685–86 (1992). 
213 See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
214 Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for Federal 
Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 225, 383 (2005) (“Compara-
tive institutional analysis is critically important to the work of scholars and other propo-
nents of law reform. These rule proponents should not suggest changes in legal rules 
without also suggesting the vehicle for the suggested reforms.”); see also Neil K. Komesar, 
Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Pol-
icy 3–13 (1994); Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who 
Should Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 1167, 
1231–46 (2003); William W. Buzbee, Sprawl’s Dynamics: A Comparative Institutional Analysis 
Critique, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 509, 529–32 (2000); Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the 
Legislature: State Attorneys General and Parens Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 913, 
961–64 (2008) (examining the respective institutional competencies of attorneys general 
and the legislature), Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the 
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1393, 1424–33 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein & 
Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 886 (2003). 
215 Komesar, supra note 214, at 5 (“[T]he decision as to who decides determines how a 
goal shapes public policy.”). 
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should be articulated first, and then institutions’ competence at meet-
ing those goals can be compared.216 
A. Goals 
 What should be the goals of a transnational court-access policy? As 
noted in the prior Section, goals may be both prudential (relating to the 
efficient and fair administration of justice) and policy-oriented (relating 
to substantive economic, regulatory, or foreign relations interests). 
1. Prudential Goals 
 On the prudential side, most participants would agree that a court-
access doctrine should promote predictability and uniformity of appli-
cation. The doctrine of forum non conveniens, as currently applied, is 
not very successful at shaping litigant behavior.217 A more determinate 
set of court-access rules should be more successful. When litigants do 
not know whether their case can go forward in a particular forum, the 
resulting uncertainty causes large transaction costs as the parties must 
fully litigate the question of access in each case. The lack of uniformity 
also causes a basic fairness problem, as some district judges are more 
likely than others to dismiss a case under similar facts. Without uni-
formity, success depends largely on successful forum shopping: plain-
tiffs who can identify more favorable district judges will be more likely 
to prevail on the forum non conveniens analysis. 
 Some of the other prudential goals of the forum non conveniens 
doctrine may still remain goals in shaping a revamped court-access doc-
trine. For example, one goal might be to facilitate thoughtful judicial 
decision making by directing cases to the courts with the most experi-
ence dealing with the applicable law and by preventing court dockets 
from becoming unmanageably crowded. Another goal might be to re-
duce conflicts between the branches of government, perhaps by allow-
ing the judiciary to restrict court access in cases that prove detrimental 
to the foreign relations policies of the other branches. 
                                                                                                                      
216 Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of Intermedi-
ary Liability for Defamation, 14 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 569, 575–76 (2001). 
217 American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994) (discussing the difficulty 
of relying on the doctrine, due to its discretionary nature and the multifariousness of its 
factors). 
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2. Policy Goals 
 The policy goals of a transnational court-access doctrine are more 
controversial. One perennial issue, of course, is whether to attempt to 
reduce the “magnet effect” of U.S. courts. Although some scholars have 
identified such a goal as an important aspect of transnational court-
access policy,218 others have disagreed.219 Steering cases away from U.S. 
courts may aid the prudential goals of reducing caseloads and encour-
aging cases to be heard in the forums most familiar with the governing 
law,  but it is also likely—at least in the short run—to minimize the po-
tential liability of U.S. multinational corporations. 
 As discussed above, adjudicating cases brought by foreign plaintiffs 
against U.S. defendants may promote U.S. interests, and thus it may be 
unwise to adopt a policy of discouraging such litigation.220 One such 
reason is the risk of retaliation. In the long run, other nations may con-
tinue to adopt retaliatory legislation, pulling additional litigation into 
foreign courts while assessing damages at U.S. levels—or even higher. 
 Thus, a second policy goal is managing foreign relations to avoid 
such a risk. Even in the absence of retaliatory legislation, as foreign 
court systems diversify their own transnational experience and remedial 
schemes, defendants may find that dismissal from U.S. courts is not the 
advantage it once was. Plaintiffs may be more easily able to pursue 
remedies abroad; if an aggressively limited court-access doctrine pushes 
those cases out of the United States, defendants may find themselves 
litigating more often in unfamiliar courts without the same due process 
protections offered by the U.S. Constitution. Thus, policymakers should 
consider a policy that encourages open access to U.S. courts, if only to 
forestall litigation in less comfortable forums. 
 A third policy goal is regulating the conduct of U.S. corporations 
abroad. Depending on how this policy goal is articulated, it could mili-
tate in favor of either greater or less court access for foreign plaintiffs. 
If the goal is to deter U.S. companies from selling defective products or 
otherwise engaging in tortious conduct abroad, then greater court ac-
                                                                                                                      
218 See Weintraub, Dispute Resolution, supra note 21, at 225–32. 
219 Kathryn Lee Boyd, The Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum Non Conveniens in 
U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 39 Va. J. Int’l L. 41, 46 (1998) (“Given that the parties will 
mostly be foreign and that the abuses will occur abroad in human rights cases, this doc-
trine of convenience, which focuses on the location of the evidence and parties, is a for-
midable obstacle for plaintiffs.”); Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in 
Search of a Role, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1259, 1324 (1986) (arguing that forum non conveniens 
should be abolished). 
220 See supra notes 182–190 and accompanying text. 
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cess may be to ensure that companies pay the full cost of the harms 
they cause. If, on the other hand, the goal is to promote U.S. exports 
and foreign trade, then a more restrictive court-access policy may pro-
tect these interests, at least in the absence of any protest or retaliatory 
effort from the affected countries. 
 A fourth policy goal is exporting American due process values. The 
“liberal legal ideology of justice” has been described as a “prized Ameri-
can cultural export.”221 Although extending U.S. courts to foreign plain-
tiffs may cause added expense and delay in the short run, it could also 
influence the development of the law in the long run. As more foreign 
plaintiffs choose to sue in the United States, appreciation for American 
due process protections may grow, and other court systems may inte-
grate familiar U.S. procedures that are perceived to work well.222 
 Finally, a fifth policy goal is providing an effective mechanism for 
corrective justice.223 At this time, the goal of corrective justice suggests a 
policy of more open access to U.S. courts. As noted, foreign plaintiffs 
are rarely able to obtain a legal remedy after dismissal from U.S. courts, 
even if one is theoretically available.224 A desire for corrective justice may 
run deeper than the instrumentalist concerns of deterrence or protect-
ing the U.S. markets from harmful products also sold abroad; one may 
also hold an “ordinary moral conception”225 that those harmed by tor-
                                                                                                                      
221 Upendra Baxi, Inconvenient Forum and Convenient Catastrophe: The Bho-
pal Case 1 (1986). 
222 Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 Cornell 
L. Rev. 1, 14 (2008) (noting that “through migration of litigation overseas,” origin states 
will “have clear evidence of their weaknesses” and thus incentive to adopt reforms). But see 
id. at 21–22 (acknowledging the tensions between “exit” and “voice,” in that while an op-
tion to litigate elsewhere may improve the judicial system by increasing citizens’ calls for 
reform, it may also have the opposite effect if the most influential citizens simply take their 
judicial business elsewhere). 
223 Jeffrey A. Van Detta, The Irony of Instrumentalism: Using Dworkin’s Principle-Rule Dis-
tinction to Reconceptualize Metaphorically a Substance-Procedure Dissonance Exemplified by Forum 
Non Conveniens Dismissals in International Product Injury Cases, 87 Marq. L. Rev. 425, 441–42 
(2004) (noting that “[s]cholars typically view corrective justice as a principle underlying 
the substantive aims of tort law,” and explaining how regulatory principles interact with 
corrective justice principles in the area of forum non conveniens). 
224 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
225 See Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents, 74 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 193, 193 (2000) (“Tort scholarship on the law of negligence has long been 
torn between two competing conceptions. One of these conceptions—the justice concep-
tion—holds that negligence law is (and should be) an articulation of our ordinary moral 
conceptions of agency and responsibility, carelessness and wrongdoing, harm and repara-
tion. The other conception—the economic conception—holds that the law of negligence 
embodies an appropriate public morality, but it takes that morality to be at best a distant 
echo of the morality of responsibility and reparation found in ordinary life.”). 
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tious conduct should be compensated, and if compensation is unavail-
able in the victim’s home country, then U.S. courts should be made 
available for that purpose. 
 The following Section examines how our governmental institu-
tions are likely to evaluate these varying goals, which goals are likely to 
be chosen, and how they may be reconciled into a coherent court-
access policy. It examines the comparative institutional competencies of 
each branch of government and outlines how each may use its com-
parative strengths to develop a more effective and sustainable court-
access policy. 
B. Institutions 
1. The Judiciary 
 As noted above, the federal district courts currently play the largest 
role in transnational court access decisions. They have considerable 
discretion to weigh the forum non conveniens factors set out by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, and—at least when a district court decides to re-
tain a case—that discretion is largely unreviewable. Certainly, there are 
some advantages to district court discretion. To the extent that the fo-
rum non conveniens doctrine is aimed at protecting limited space on 
court dockets, district court judges know the limits of their dockets bet-
ter than anyone else and are in the best position to decide whether ac-
cepting a case with limited connection to their forum will cause hard-
ship or delay to other litigants. 
 District court judges may also be in the best position to evaluate 
litigant motives and convenience. Unlike appellate courts that must 
deal with a cold record, the district court judge has considerable power 
to hold preliminary hearings and to view the litigants themselves.226 In 
addition, federal court judges tend to be much more insulated from 
political pressures than members of the other branches.227 Given both 
the insulation from political pressure and the ground-level view of the 
litigants and proceedings, it has been said that “[t]he judiciary is the 
                                                                                                                      
226 Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Emory L.J. 747, 761 (1982) (not-
ing that the trial judge has a “superior opportunity to get the feel of the case”) (quoting 
Noonan v. Cunard Steamship Co., 375 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1967)); Robertson, supra note 
127, at 215 (“One area of trial court competence is its direct contact with witnesses.”). 
227 David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 Va. L. Rev. 519, 555 (1988) 
(“Federal judges are not elected, and in the states, where election is more common, a vari-
ety of efforts have been made to reduce the susceptibility of judges to political pressures.”). 
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institution of sober second thought—the branch responsible for relat-
ing broad policy objectives to flesh-and-blood facts.”228 
 District court control, however, also comes with several disadvan-
tages. Although a court might be good at applying “broad policy objec-
tives” to specific cases, the policy objectives of the forum non conven-
iens doctrine are extremely imprecise. As noted in the prior Section, it 
is unclear whether the doctrine is mandatory or permissive, to what 
extent it should be used to punish or regulate forum shopping, and 
whether it should recognize economic and foreign policy concerns.229 
Although district courts may be good at applying policy objectives, they 
are less capable of setting those objectives. This difficulty lies partially in 
the structure of district courts, as a single judge may adopt a perfectly 
reasonable policy objective, but no other judge will be obligated to fol-
low it. Thus, without systematic appellate review, inconsistency and un-
predictability are all but guaranteed. 
 Furthermore, a district court’s policy objectives may remain unar-
ticulated—to the public if the judge does not write an opinion explain-
ing his or her underlying policy assumptions, and, potentially, to the 
court itself if policy assumptions exist only in the judge’s subconscious 
mind.230 One scholar has argued that district judges’ tendency to dis-
miss cases under the doctrine of forum non conveniens suggests that 
judges are making a policy decision to defer to other sovereigns’ regu-
latory authority by “for[going] opportunities to influence transnational 
activity.”231 Yet this largely unstated assumption may just as easily cut the 
other way: by dismissing cases involving U.S. defendants, judges may 
indeed be “influencing transnational activity.” Specifically, they may be 
shielding U.S. defendants from facing liability for transnational activity. 
To the extent that either policy underlies a significant number of dis-
missals, however, such policies are largely unarticulated and may well 
operate entirely unnoticed.232 
 In addition, any attempt to influence transnational activity is also 
hampered by a lack of information. Scholars have noted that few judges 
rely on empirical evidence of sovereign interests; instead, they tend to 
rely on “simple intuitive judgment about the foreign relations conse-
                                                                                                                      
228 David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 585 (1985). 
229 See supra notes 123–209 and accompanying text. 
230 See Friendly, supra note 226, at 757 (describing “the subconscious mind-set from 
which few judges are immune”). 
231 Whytock, supra note 85, at 16. 
232 See Robertson, supra note 74, at 371–75. 
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quences” of a case disposition.233 Of course, district court judges are not 
in a position to collect empirical evidence on their own, and informa-
tion supplied by the parties is necessarily partisan. Nevertheless, these 
case-by-case intuitive judgments hamper standardization--they have led 
to “non-uniform foreign policy proclamations by the federal courts.”234 
 Some commentators have recommended giving the appellate 
courts a more significant role in forum non conveniens rulings through 
interlocutory appeals, specifically by allowing the circuit courts of ap-
peals to review decisions retaining cases in addition to decisions dismiss-
ing cases.235 Appellate courts can offer more standardization; unlike dis-
trict court rulings, which bind no other court, appellate court rulings 
bind a vast swath of district court judges within their geographical re-
gion. As a result, appellate rulings can offer a greater degree of predict-
ability and certainty to future litigants. 
 Although appellate courts might be a standardizing influence, they 
cannot establish a full set of court-access rules all at once. Appellate 
courts still analyze only one particular case at a time. Thus, if an appel-
late court were to consider the foreign relations implications of dismiss-
ing a case, it would look at the impact of dismissing a particular case: 
would another sovereign be offended that the case had been dis-
missed? Occasionally, a foreign sovereign may participate in a case ei-
ther as a party or an amicus, and the court can consider its position at 
that time.236 Much of the foreign relations impact, however, comes not 
from a particular case or a particular disposition, but rather from the 
aggregate of dispositions over time. Dismissal of a single plaintiff’s case 
may not cause an appreciable effect on foreign relations, but the re-
peated dismissal of many cases over time might cause considerably 
more concern.237 An appellate court considering a single case will not 
examine the aggregate impact of litigation. 
                                                                                                                      
233 Lumen N. Mulligan, Note, No Longer Safe at Home: Preventing the Misuse of Federal 
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236 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 546–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (including 
Ecuador as a participant in pretrial hearings); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disas-
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237 See Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 544–46. The dismissal of this very large class action 
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dor, to Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney Gen. ( Jan. 15, 1997), available at http://www.iaba.org/ 
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 Furthermore, although appellate courts have a standardizing in-
fluence, appellate decisions still leave much room for inconsistency. In 
areas of law where the policy goals are clear, appellate rulings may be 
sufficient to clear up procedural disagreements. In the area of forum 
non conveniens, however, there is so little agreement, that even in the 
one area where appellate review is allowed—when a judgment of dis-
missal has been entered—the large number of circuit splits have made 
it so that litigants can find little to help them predict how future cases 
will be resolved.238 U.S. Supreme Court review could have a substantial 
impact in standardizing transnational court-access policy and correct-
ing these circuit splits, but they are currently so numerous that they 
would overwhelm the Supreme Court docket. 
2. Congress 
 Congressional action could succeed in two important ways in 
which the judiciary’s case-by-case determinations cannot. First, codify-
ing the principles of court access could provide a higher level of stan-
dardization and clarity, as a statute could proactively set out a cohesive 
scheme for courts to decline jurisdiction, rather than forcing courts to 
wait for issues to arise in particular cases. A number of state legislatures 
have adopted forum non conveniens statutes, much as they have 
adopted statutes prescribing personal jurisdiction.239 Statutory author-
ity can clarify the factors to be considered, and can specify whether 
dismissal is permissive or mandatory when the factors are met.240 
 The second major benefit of congressional action is that it would 
provide a platform for intentional policymaking, rather than require 
deference to the unacknowledged mix of prudential and policy goals 
                                                                                                                      
the forum non conveniens doctrine to “close the doors of American courts to citizens of 
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certiorari to consider any or all of these issues almost at any time it desires.”); J. Clifford 
Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a Mountain or a 
Molehill?, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 913, 930 (1983) (concluding that circuit splits “encourag[e] tac-
tical ploys designed to avoid the unfavorable approach of one circuit or take advantage of 
the favorable approach of another circuit”). 
239 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 6–5–430 (2005); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 71.051(b) 
(2008); Wis. Stat. § 801.63 (2008); see also other statutes cited in Weintraub, International 
Litigation, supra note 21, at 345 n.188. 
240 See In re Gen. Elec. Co., 271 S.W.3d 685–87, 686 (Tex. 2008) (noting that the Texas 
legislature had amended the forum non conveniens statute to provide that the district 
judge “shall” dismiss when the factors are met, whereas the prior statute had provided that 
the judge “may” dismiss). 
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articulated by the judiciary.241 Such a platform would also include sub-
stantial resources devoted to that task.242 Although judicial decisions 
dismissing cases under the forum non conveniens doctrine certainly 
have policy implications, they do not provide the same institutional le-
gitimacy that lawmaking by Congress could provide.243 As others have 
noted, because the very function of the legislative branch is to debate 
and determine policy, Congress’s institutional competence in the poli-
cymaking arena is unparalleled: “The Congress is elected to make pol-
icy, and its members campaign on what kind of policy decisions they 
propose to make. There is active and partisan debate about those deci-
sions . . . .”244 
 The lawmaking process is also much more open to outside partici-
pation than the judicial branch. Whereas judges are more likely to rely 
on heuristics such as territoriality as a proxy for actually gathering in-
formation about the “preferences and decisions of other political ac-
tors,”245 the lawmaking process is specifically designed to encourage 
input from those affected by its decisions: “Congress, functioning 
through committees, solicits the views of all concerned about decisions 
to be made. Experts are consulted who offer all kinds of testimony and 
material as to how policy should be crafted. Moreover, every special in-
terest makes sure that its interests are addressed.”246 
 Finally, Congress can set court-access fees at a level that ensures the 
U.S. judiciary will not be financially burdened by litigation arising else-
where. One of the oft-stated concerns that supports a robust doctrine 
of forum non conveniens is the need to ensure that taxpayers whose 
dollars support court operations are not unduly burdened.247 Congress 
can, by statute, require foreign litigants to pay higher fees in cases that 
                                                                                                                      
241 See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text. 
242 See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 Va. L. Rev. 
1617, 1682 (1997) (“Furthermore, Congress has special committees and subcommittees 
with permanent staffs devoted to monitoring various aspects of the United States’ relations 
with foreign countries.”). 
243 Shapiro, supra note 227, at 551 (“It is possible for courts to do many of the things 
that legislatures do, and vice-versa. Yet there comes a point when the effort involves a con-
siderable strain on the institution in question—when it is clear that one branch is doing 
something that is done far better, or with a good deal more legitimacy, by the other.”). 
244 Abner J. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers: A Response to Professor Neal Ka-
tyal, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1825, 1828 (1998). 
245 Whytock, supra note 85, at 13. 
246 Mikva, supra note 244, at 1828. 
247 See Barrett, supra note 61, at 404; see also One Hundred & Ninety-Four Shawls, 18 F. 
Cas. 703, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1848) (No. 10,521) (concluding that courts should not prioritize 
cases involving litigants “owing no allegiance to its laws, and contributing in no way to its 
support”). 
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might otherwise be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens.248 A variable fee structure would reduce costs in two ways: first, 
in a direct way through externalizing the cost of hearing foreign cases, 
and second, indirectly through avoiding the cost of an initial hearing. 
Right now, even dismissals under the doctrine of forum non conven-
iens impose costs in the initial hearing and in any enforcement action 
after the case is tried elsewhere.249 With congressional authorization, 
however, fees could be set at level to recoup the actual cost of litigation 
and thereby avoid the need for local taxpayer subsidization.250 
 Congress’s most significant disadvantage—its vulnerability to in-
terest-group capture—is the flip side of its advantage in openness and 
participation.251 It is easy to imagine that a statute regulating foreign-
ers’ access to U.S. courts would tilt strongly toward parochial interests 
and support U.S. multinationals’ desire to avoid American courts. Such 
a result is not guaranteed; after all, at the time such legislation is pro-
posed, future litigation is likely speculative, and a more generous court-
access policy might encourage other countries to allow greater direct 
investment and corporate activity.252 Multinational corporations acting 
behind a veil of ignorance may not know whether the risk of unwanted 
U.S. lawsuits is likely to outweigh the benefits of opening access to new 
markets.253 Not all corporations, however, operate behind such a veil. 
In particular, large oil and gas or agricultural entities may rightly sus-
pect that their operations are particularly likely to be targeted in large 
                                                                                                                      
248 Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 222, at 64–65. 
249 See Casey & Ristroph, supra note 93, at 41. 
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initiatives may be especially vulnerable to interest-group capture). 
252 See Brooke Clagett, Comment, Forum Non Conveniens in International Environmental 
Tort Suits: Closing the Doors of the U.S. Courts to Foreign Plaintiffs, 9 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 513, 522 
(1996) (“U.S. multinational corporations will continue to injure the environment in de-
veloping countries whose needs for foreign investment appear greater than their interest 
in preserving a healthy natural environment for their own citizens.”). 
253 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 118–23 (1975) (developing the concept of a 
‘veil of ignorance,’ which asks what societal rules parties would make if they were forced to 
act without knowledge of whether those rules would prove beneficial or detrimental to 
them personally). 
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transnational lawsuits.254 As a result, they are likely to lobby heavily for a 
limited court-access doctrine. 
 Assuming that Congress is likely to adopt such a restrictive policy, 
are the benefits worth the risks of legislative action? For those who sup-
port a restrictive access policy in general, the answer is clearly yes.255 Yet 
even those who support more openness may be willing to accept the risk 
of restrictive congressional action. First, the benefits that stem from 
predictability are not insignificant. If parties know at the outset that 
court access is strictly limited, they can plan accordingly; such legislation 
in the United States may encourage other countries to adopt legislation 
allowing higher damages awards, much like the Parlatino model.256 In 
addition, such legislation could provide a firm target for lobbying Con-
gress: if, indeed, there is international opposition to such legislation, it 
would not be unusual to revisit the issue again. As others have pointed 
out, Congress is in a much better position than the courts “to experi-
ment, to monitor the results, and to revise the experiment in the light of 
those results.”257 Finally, legislative action does not foreclose the possibil-
ity of executive action through treaty negotiation—in fact, even highly 
restrictive court-access legislation may function as a starting point for 
bilateral or multilateral conventions. 
3. Executive Branch 
 Given that the executive branch generally has the largest role in 
foreign relations, it is somewhat surprising that it has had only a small 
role in articulating transnational court-access policies. The executive 
branch, however, has not been entirely without influence; its participa-
tion in individual cases as well as its treaty-making powers guarantee 
that the executive branch has a role in ensuring that federal courts’ 
openness to litigation comports with U.S. interests in the foreign policy 
arena. 
 When an individual case is clearly important enough to influence 
foreign relations, the executive branch will share its views with the fo-
                                                                                                                      
254 Dole Food Co., for example, has been the frequent target of lawsuits based on 
events occurring in Central America and has funded legal research on the subject of the 
forum non conveniens doctrine. See Scott, supra note 157, at 103–04 (arguing in favor of 
mandatory dismissal of cases brought by foreign plaintiffs against U.S. defendants in fed-
eral court based on conduct abroad) (research funded by Dole Food Co.). 
255 See id. 
256 See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. 
257 Shapiro, supra note 227, at 555. 
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rum court.258 U.S. courts have been quite receptive to executive branch 
participation in comparable matters; in foreign sovereign immunity 
cases, for example, the Supreme Court noted that it has “‘consistently 
. . . deferred to the decisions of the political branches—in particular, 
those of the Executive Branch—on whether to take jurisdiction’ over 
particular actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentali-
ties.”259 Thus, in a case of extraordinary importance, the executive 
branch may file an amicus brief or otherwise present its views to the 
forum court. 
 A more systematic executive influence arises through the treaty-
making power. Treaties are considered equivalent to statutes as sources 
of governing law.260 Since 1775—even before the Declaration of Inde-
pendence was signed—the United States has entered into commercial 
treaties that gave foreign nationals some access to U.S. courts.261 Today, 
the United States has bilateral “Friendship, Commerce, and Naviga-
tion” (FCN) treaties with a large number of countries, and many of 
those treaties provide access to U.S. courts on the same terms as U.S. 
citizens.262 As a result, some courts have held that any forum non con-
veniens analysis involving a plaintiff from a treaty member state cannot 
treat the foreign plaintiff any less deferentially than the court would 
treat a U.S. resident plaintiff.263 Other courts have interpreted such 
                                                                                                                      
258 See 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2006) (“The Solicitor General, or any officer of the Depart-
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259 Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689 (2004) (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. 
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260 Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs 63 (1990) 
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262 Id. at 267, 281. 
263 See, e.g., Blanco v. Banco Indus. de Venez., S.A., 997 F.2d 974, 981 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(“Because such a treaty exists between the United States and Venezuela, no discount may 
be imposed upon the plaintiff’s initial choice of a New York forum in this case solely be-
cause Proyecfin is a foreign corporation.”); Irish Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta, 739 
F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Because of the existence of the two international compacts, 
the district court should have applied the same forum non conveniens standards that it would 
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treaties more narrowly, however, holding that the treaties require only 
that foreign citizens be treated similarly to U.S. citizens residing 
abroad—and that neither category of plaintiff should be accorded 
much deference in the forum non conveniens analysis.264 It is clear that 
the treaties are open to more than one interpretation. The existence of 
the treaties themselves, however, speaks to executive branch interest in 
foreign citizens’ access to U.S. courts. If the executive branch and U.S. 
treaty partners believe that the treaties are being interpreted too nar-
rowly, they can negotiate clarifications to more explicitly address access 
standards and the role of forum non conveniens. 
 The United States has also participated in negotiations for a num-
ber of multilateral conventions that bear on the question of court ac-
cess and, specifically, on forum non conveniens. The proposed Hague 
Judgments Convention dealt with forum non conveniens explicitly, of-
fering a compromise between the civil law tradition of lis pendens and 
the common law tradition of forum non conveniens.265 Ultimately, 
however, the convention failed,266 and a less ambitious choice-of-court 
convention was adopted in its stead; this convention allows parties to 
include a choice-of-court clause in commercial contracts and ensures 
                                                                                                                      
have applied to a United States citizen.”); Jennings v. Boeing Co., 660 F. Supp. 796, 800 
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264 Varnelo v. Eastwind Transp., No. 02 Civ. 2084, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1424, at *44 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003) (“Thus, a foreign plaintiff residing overseas should receive the 
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ing abroad.”); In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445, 527 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (“The FCN 
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265 See Stuckelberg, supra note 54, at 961 (“In the negotiation in The Hague, the ques-
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Note, American Forum Non Conveniens in Light of the Hague Convention on Choice-of-Court 
Agreements, 69 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 165, 168 (2007) (criticizing the convention’s rejection of 
forum non conveniens). 
266 See Stuckelberg, supra note 54, at 967–68 (describing the controversy surrounding 
forum non conveniens at the Hague convention and noting that common law countries 
perceive the doctrine “as an indispensable tool for a fair exercise of justice . . . in particu-
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of this new exception offered to the defendants; which increases the duration and the 
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that courts in each of the signatory nations will enforce such clauses.267 
If the convention is ratified, forum non conveniens would no longer be 
an issue in cases arising under such contracts; parties could specify by 
contract which court, or courts, should be deemed convenient, and 
courts in member nations would be obligated to follow that ruling.268 
 Until now, the executive branch has had little direct involvement 
in forum non conveniens issues. Yet, given the increasing recognition 
that the court-access doctrine implicates U.S. foreign interests, execu-
tive branch participation may well increase. The United States can in-
tervene in particular cases if they are individually significant. Other-
wise, the treatymaking power offers a more systematic approach to en-
suring access to U.S. courts. 
C. Combining Institutional Strengths 
 Each branch of government possesses relative institutional strengths 
and weaknesses. If the branches work together, however, they may be 
able to articulate a more coherent approach to court access that im-
proves upon the current chaos of the forum non conveniens doctrine. 
Reform should begin in Congress: Congress’s experience in weighing 
difficult policy choices, ensuring participation of all interested parties, 
and legislating proactively all suggest that it should take the lead in ar-
ticulating a court-access doctrine. This policy debate should explicitly 
consider U.S. interests in opening federal courts to suits by foreign plain-
tiffs. Congress can, and should, consider the economic and regulatory 
interests in having U.S. courts decide cases involving the foreign conduct 
of domestic corporations. 
 Ideally, forum non conveniens legislation would open the federal 
courts to cases brought by foreign plaintiffs. A closed system may save 
administrative costs and may protect U.S. corporate defendants in the 
short run.269 Yet it also creates a significant risk of retaliation, encourag-
ing other countries to create mechanisms to hold U.S. corporations 
accountable for the harms they cause abroad—and, perhaps, to hold 
                                                                                                                      
267 Brand & Jablonski, supra note 9, at 147–48. The United States had signed the con-
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them accountable with much higher damages than they would face in 
the United States, and without U.S.-style due process protections.270 
 An open system avoids this risk and offers several other benefits. 
First, it provides an opportunity to regulate the conduct of U.S. corpo-
rations, which may be particularly important when that conduct affects 
U.S. residents as well as nonresidents. In addition, openness to foreign 
plaintiffs advertises the advantages of the U.S. justice system, and may 
encourage the export of U.S. due process protections.271 As business 
becomes ever more global, U.S. parties are likely to benefit from justice 
systems influenced by the U.S. system. Finally, an open court system 
would help ensure the availability of corrective justice when harms oc-
cur.272 At this time, the remedies available elsewhere are still more 
theoretical than real; an open court system in the U.S. facilitates re-
dress. 
 Although the mechanics of open-access legislation are less impor-
tant than the existence of such legislation, it is nevertheless helpful to 
examine what such a statute might look like. I propose that the statute 
should provide, at a minimum, that U.S. district courts presumptively 
accept a case against U.S. resident defendants as long as jurisdiction 
and venue are satisfied. Dismissal should be allowed only upon a find-
ing both that another forum is available in another country and that 
the defendant would be unable to present its defenses in the U.S. due 
to difficulties in obtaining evidence or establishing jurisdiction over 
parties or witnesses located elsewhere. Given concerns about cost and 
administrative burden, such legislation might be tied to a higher fee 
schedule that allows such cases to proceed without taxpayer subsidy.273 
 Although the benefits of open access outweigh its detriments, it is 
possible that Congress would be persuaded by constituent corporations 
to create a more restrictive court-access doctrine. Such legislation 
might function similarly (but with opposite effect) to the one described 
above; for example, it might presumptively dismiss cases brought by 
foreign plaintiffs that involve actions occurring outside the United 
States.274 The possibility of such legislation is not an argument against 
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congressional intervention. Such restrictive legislation, although short-
sighted, may still offer substantial benefits of certainty and predictabil-
ity and therefore provide at least incremental improvement over the 
current haphazard doctrine. 
 Restrictive legislation could also provide a default rule subject to 
modification through treaty. If indeed congressional policy is overly 
parochial and too deferential to U.S. corporate interests, then the ex-
ecutive branch can take the lead in developing bilateral and multilat-
eral treaties ensuring access to courts. Individual countries could nego-
tiate such treaties bilaterally as part of trade negotiations; perhaps as a 
condition of allowing more U.S. investment, countries might insist that 
their citizens be granted access to U.S. courts for torts arising out of the 
conduct of U.S. defendants and that the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens should not apply in such a case. Although the executive branch 
may not want to encroach upon congressional action, it is also not for-
mally bound by such action; a later-enacted treaty will trump previous 
legislation.275 
 In any case, even if Congress has set a restrictive default rule, it 
may not object to more specific treaties enacted in response to interna-
tional political negotiation. After all, if the executive branch negotiates 
bilateral court-access treaties only with specific countries that have ob-
jected to a restrictive court-access policy, such treaty-based exceptions 
may be individualized enough that Congress does not perceive them as 
an obstacle to a generally restrictive policy. Furthermore, if an individ-
ual country has objected to restrictive court access, that objection may 
signal that the country is likely to enact retaliatory legislation. Con-
gress—and its affected constituents—may strongly prefer that such 
countries are exempted from restrictive court-access statutes. 
 The executive branch can also continue to negotiate multilateral 
conventions. Although the Hague Judgments Convention failed to pass, 
the need for standardized enforcement of judgments is great enough 
that future efforts to renew such an agreement are likely. If the parties 
are negotiating under a framework where the default court-access rules 
have been codified, then expectations may be framed accordingly: 
other parties may have a greater understanding of the U.S. policy once 
it has been articulated by a legislative body, and to the extent that 
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changes to that policy can be negotiated, they will have a clear starting 
point for discussion.276 
 Finally, even with legislative—and perhaps executive—action, judi-
cial discretion will still play a role. Once the court-access policies have 
been set, district judges can apply them more easily than the multi-
factor considerations they now apply. And even a well-articulated and 
open-access legislative policy should still leave some room for judicial 
discretion. Because of district courts’ proximity to litigants and wit-
nesses, Congress may want to defer to district court discretion in allow-
ing judges to dismiss individual cases when the court concludes that the 
plaintiff is abusing the legal process, or when the State Department in-
tervenes to seek dismissal due to a specific foreign-relations matter.277 
With congressional guidance about what factors to apply, courts can 
more easily determine the adequacy of particular alternative forums; 
the court can hear testimony and develop an individual case record in a 
way that no other branch can do. Judicial discretion is likely to be en-
hanced by input from the other branches: because the courts will not 
need to re-create policy in each decision, judges can focus on the pri-
mary judicial strength of “relating broad policy objectives to flesh-and-
blood facts.”278 
Conclusion 
 Scholars, courts, and commentators agree that the current court-
access doctrines are confused, chaotic, and in need of reform. Until 
now, however, reform has proved to be an elusive goal. That may now 
be changing. In the past, dismissal from a U.S. court often represented 
a win for defendants, as foreign plaintiffs rarely attempted to re-file the 
cases abroad. Yet, as other countries have begun to enact retaliatory 
legislation that allows such cases to go forward with U.S.-level (or 
greater) damage awards, multinational corporations face a real threat 
of liability. In the Aguinda case cited at the beginning of this Article, for 
example, Chevron might have preferred to face liability in U.S. courts 
rather than the $27 billion judgment that was recommended in the Ec-
uadorian court. Because domestic corporations can no longer rely on 
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court-access doctrines to insulate them from liability in transnational 
cases, they may be more willing to join the call for reform. 
 Traditionally, most scholarship has had a “single institution” focus 
on the judiciary as the agent of such reform. Such a focus is short 
sighted and does not accommodate the growing importance of trans-
national legal and business activity. Reform will be best accomplished 
when all three branches take an active role: Congress in articulating an 
initial court-access policy, the executive branch in negotiating bilateral 
treaties and multilateral court-access conventions, and the judiciary in 
applying these policies to individual cases. 
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